352 Events

President Hassan Rouhani with a face mask, 25 July 2020. Rouhani says Iran is retaliating against U.S. sanctions.

Wikimedia CC/Tasnim News Agency

Seminar - Open to the Public

Calibrated Resistance: The Political Dynamics of Iran's Nuclear Policymaking under Trump

Thu., May 20, 2021 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: Abolghasem Bayyenat, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Drawing parallel with domestic and international conditions leading to the successful conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015, this research seeks to put Iran's nuclear policymaking during the Trump administration into perspective and explain why Iran pursued the strategy of calibrated resistance, how this strategy became possible, and why alternative policies became unthinkable or impossible.

Everyone is welcome to join us via Zoom! Please register before the event:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJYqfuGqrjIiE9WN_u4jDdSGCkYNnTLu1_31 

New indigenous PHWR (Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor) under construction, Gujarat, India, 9 June 2016.

Wikimedia CC/Reetesh Chaurasia

Seminar - Open to the Public

Technology Transfer, Control, and Re-invention of the Indian Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor

Thu., Apr. 29, 2021 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: Aditi Verma, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral  Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

The design and creation of complex socio-technical systems require the production and use of both tacit and explicit knowledge. This seminar explores the role of tacit knowledge in the transfer and reinvention of complex, dual-use technologies — in this case, pressurized heavy water reactors — and the implications of the generation of this tacit knowledge for technology control.

Everyone is welcome to join us via Zoom! Please register before the event:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJYucOGgpj4iG9ChfkgqbBwsu3OKLDyJ6Uwh 

President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad makes a public speech at Columbia University in New York City, 24 September 2007.

Wikimedia CC/Daniella Zalcman

Seminar - Open to the Public

Causes and Consequences of Public Cueing in Nuclear Decision-Making

Thu., Jan. 28, 2021 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speakers: Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom; Ariel Petrovics, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

This seminar seeks to examine the causes and consequences of public involvement in nuclear programs in two parts: first, exploring why some leaders involve the public in nuclear discussions, and then assessing shifts in public opinion in response to such cueing. Together, these  parts can help better understand when and how domestic publics can affect the trajectory of their states' nuclear programs.

Everyone is welcome to join us via Zoom! Register before the seminar here: 
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJEpceGprj0qHtYbTdT-_mgWIZVU_VNPqtZa

A deserted classroom in Pripyat, Ukraine, three decades after the Chernobyl disaster, 10 March 2013.

Wikimedia CC/DmytroChapman

Seminar - Open to the Public

Recent Lessons for the Recovery from Acts of Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism

Thu., Oct. 29, 2020 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: Julius Weitzdörfer, Junior Professor of East Asian Law, Hagen University, Germany

Risks stemming from CBRN-terrorism (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) are characterized by relatively low frequency, yet extraordinary potential impact. To help reduce the enormous potential costs associated with radiological and nuclear terrorism, drawing on cases from Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, this seminar seeks to derive and improve recovery policies towards a well-rounded, holistic approach to mitigating the risks of nuclear and radiological terrorism.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Register in advance for this meeting: https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJAoc-yhrjwrEtEXOUTdHqGhMvLscB5VO38u

Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Helsinki in July 2018.

Wikimedia Commons

Seminar - Open to the Public

The Future World Order: Arms Control

Fri., Sep. 25, 2020 | 12:30pm - 2:00pm

Online

The Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs will host a discussion on the future of arms control, as part of a new HKS series on The Future World Order.  The participants will be Emma Belcher (Ploughshares Fund), Matthew Bunn (Belfer Center/Managing the Atom) and Steven E. Miller (Belfer Center/International Security Program).  Professor Stephen Walt (Belfer Center/ISP) will moderate.

Cascade of gas centrifuges used to produce enriched uranium in the U.S. gas centrifuge plant in Piketon, Ohio, 1984.

DOE Photo

Seminar - Open to the Public

A-Bomb for the People: Domestic Drivers of Nuclear Latency

Thu., June 4, 2020 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speakers: Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom; Ariel Petrovics, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Though only nine states in the world today are believed to possess their own nuclear weapons, many more states have the capability to pursue a nuclear bomb if they choose. This capability – or nuclear latency – has recently drawn attention in international relations scholarship, which largely focuses on the effects of latency on international deterrence, compellence, and bargaining. While this research helps explain the security benefits and motives that may drive states to pursue nuclear capabilities short of the bomb, it has yet to determine how domestic politics play into these considerations. This project explores how public opinion factors into state decisions to pursue or forgo latent nuclear capabilities. In doing so, it seeks to offer new insight into when and why latency can become a salient topic to domestic audiences, and the implications of these domestic drivers for the future of nonproliferation.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJwuc-qrqj4pG90vSX2_VoG35zaE6L6mkPQt

A nuclear advanced designated marksman assists in a launch facility exercise.

USAF/Beau Wade, 341st Missile Wing Public Affairs

Seminar - Open to the Public

A Sense of Purpose: The Bedrock of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

Thu., May 21, 2020 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: Lt. Col. William C. Smith, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

How do leaders motivate Airmen to give their best to perform this unsung duty, day after day, for years at a time? A recent study found clarity of purpose to be the basis of verifiable mission success, purposeful leadership, and esprit de corps, which suggests that clearly communicating the higher purpose of their work to Airmen would help them find meaning in their tasks. A sense that their work is meaningful, the result of internalizing a higher purpose, underpins the safety and security cultures critical to a successful nuclear enterprise. The speaker will build on their findings by introducing five leadership concepts, identifying the particular importance each plays in providing a credible nuclear deterrent, and offering an effective method for implementation. These principles have broad application to organizational leadership as a whole, and if collectively and effectively implemented, would provide the bedrock for safe, secure, and effective nuclear operations.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJEvdO-sqT4oH9VljkvSrgNBBGATIdqGjGBY

First meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 1 April 1974.

UN Photo

Seminar - Open to the Public

After the Negotiations: Understanding Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control

Thu., May 14, 2020 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: Stephen Herzog, Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Arms control has languished as a field of academic inquiry, despite a renaissance in nuclear security studies and significant advances in understanding proliferation. Few studies have attempted to emulate past academic shaping of arms control agreements and outcomes, with particularly limited emphasis on multilateral efforts. This is a problematic situation as the world looks beyond bilateral U.S.–Russian arms control toward the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (MENWFZ), and even the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The speaker attempts to fill this gap by offering a theory of state entry into multilateral nuclear arms control agreements.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJEtc-mrqz8jH9coGNTF7bloNM75UeKB3bJW

The USS Pennsylvania, a nuclear-armed Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine

U.S. Navy Photo

Seminar - Open to the Public

Nuclear Platform Diversification: A New Dataset

Thu., May 7, 2020 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speakers: Giles David Arceneaux, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Kyungwon Suh, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University

The deterrent capacity of a state's nuclear forces is dependent upon the platforms and delivery systems that constitute the arsenal. The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not provide a robust deterrent and nuclear states cannot credibly deter potential adversaries with nuclear threats in the absence of adequate delivery capabilities. The project presents a new dataset that measures the possession of seven nuclear delivery platforms across all nuclear powers from 1945–2019, including: submarine-launched missiles, strategic land-mobile missiles, strategic solid-fuel missiles, nuclear cruise missiles, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, long-range ballistic missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar: https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJcsf-6uqTwoHdZZJ3qqoP1Ohy78rsXBc5en

President Donald J. Trump signs an EO on Iran Sanctions in the Green Room at Trump National Golf Club, August 5, 2018, in Bedminster Township, New Jersey.

White House Photo/Shealah Craighead

Seminar - Open to the Public

Turning Paper Screws: The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions in International Security

Thu., Apr. 9, 2020 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: Ariel Petrovics, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Economic sanctions are one of the most common coercive tools of foreign policy, used regularly in an effort to change target state behavior. Yet despite their versatility and prevalence in international relations, sanctions are at best an unreliable tool of foreign policy. Indeed, many of the most important and publicized sanction attempts have failed to produce any desired change in the target. Existing literature on the effectiveness of sanctions has largely focused on whether or not sanctions eventually succeed, but this overlooks the arguable more policy relevant questions of when and under what conditions sanctions are effective tools of statecraft. The speaker's research  finds that sanctions with the greatest implications for international security such as those that combat nuclear proliferation or foreign military aggression fail even more catastrophically than their less salient counterparts.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Click here. Meeting ID number: 810311271