Science, Technology, and Public Policy

In this journal article for Survival, Aaron Arnold argues that the success of financial sanctions rests largely on the dominance of the US dollar and the correspondent banking system. Yet emerging trends could undermine Washington’s capacity to employ this tool.

"Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. They do not exist in appreciable quantities in nature and are quite difficult to produce. But with such materials in hand, most states—and potentially even some particularly sophisticated terrorist groups—would be able to make at least a crude nuclear explosive. Hence controlling those materials and the means to make them is a critical element of regulating the path to the bomb..."

Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are not suitable for the Iranian Army, given its non-mechanized nature; its defensive military posture; its current status as a non-nuclear weapon state; and its sufficient conventional preparation to meet its protective security interests. This paper proposes three interlinked policy approaches to resolve the current impasse.

President Rouhani's initiative to restart nuclear negotiations has been met with deep skepticism in Israel. Haifa University political scientist Ehud Eiran and MTA Executive Director Martin Malin suggest in the current issue of The Washington Quarterly that Israel's framing of, and response to, the Iranian nuclear program is a product of four distinct fears: existential threat, strategic risk, socio-economic erosion, and a challenge to founding principles. Understanding the sources and consequences of these fears can help policy makers avoid dangerous pitfalls and missed opportunities in their response to the current Iranian initiative.

In the Doomsday Clock issue of the Bulletin, the author takes a look at five events that unfolded in 2011 and that seem certain to cast a powerful shadow in months and years to come. No new breakthroughs occurred, the author writes, adding that 2012 could be a much more difficult year.

Israeli’s attack on Iraq’s nearly operational Osirak reactor in 1981 may have caused immediate delays in Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, but ultimately it may have galvanized Iraq into revamping its nuclear program.  Prior to the attack, Iraq’s nuclear program was disorganized and inconsistently supported; it also lacked a steady budget.  Immediately after the attack, Iraq established a covert nuclear program aimed specifically at producing nuclear weapons.  Although preventative attacks can be affective in the short term, it is crucial to consider that such attacks may create a consensus among leaders about the need for nuclear weapons and therefore lead to an intensified nuclear program.

"What does the historical record suggest about the consequences of a potential American or Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear program? Although military force delayed proliferation in some previous cases, policymakers must remember that past may not be prologue. In particular, the three indirect mechanisms we identified are unlikely to 'work' in the Iranian case."