Science, Technology, and Public Policy

"This isolation has left Tehran no option but to turn to Moscow. And, as relations between the US and Russia have deteriorated, the Middle Eastern state has the scope to become an evermore decisive and divisive factor."

"Like the Taliban’s Afghanistan before 9/11, the Islamic State may become a safe haven for people from other groups and countries to train and plot complex attacks."

Matthew Bunn and Will Tobey spoke with Piet de Klerk, the Dutch Sherpa organizing the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, on October 7 at a United Nations event sponsored by the Dutch mission to the UN. In these slides, Bunn and Tobey provide an updated summary of the threat of nuclear terrorism and recommendations for next steps to reduce the threat, based in part on the new U.S.-Russian report, Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism.

Despite substantial progress in improving nuclear security in recent years, there is more to be done.  The threats of nuclear theft and terrorism remain very real. This presentation recommends learning from the much stronger national and international efforts in nuclear safety, and in particular, taking steps to build international understanding of the threat; establish effective performance objectives; assure performance; train and certify needed personnel; build security culture and exchange best practices; reduce the number of sites that need to be protected; and strengthen the international framework and continue the dialogue once leaders are no longer meeting regularly at the summit level. Matthew Bunn presented this talk, based on a recent paper, on July 3rd, 2013 at the International Conference on Nuclear Security in Vienna.

Matthew Bunn's introduction to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit.

Matthew Bunn presented "The threat of nuclear terrorism: What’s new? What’s true?" at a conference in Seoul, 3-5 November, 2011.

The United States' wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to come to an end, even after the death of Osama Bin Laden. These wars which were initiated and continued based on the sacred and ideological aim of the complete destruction of world terrorism (Al Qaeda) will simultaneously provide the grounds for local and opposing forces to justify their resistance in the form of a sacred ideological war against foreign occupiers. In the case of a bilateral ideological war, with no possible winner, therefore the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have mostly local and regional roots, will not come to end in the near future.

"Following the parliamentary elections of Iraq in March 2010 and the long-time deadlock which had stalled formation of the coalition government for nearly 8 months and the West's disappointing efforts to talk with the Taliban, it is now crystal-clear that the United States cannot tackle these crises single-handedly and needs Iran's cooperation as the main regional actor in settling the crises in Iraq and Afghanistan, either during the presence and even after the withdrawal of American troops from both countries. The importance of this issue becomes manifest as one realizes that curbing terrorist activities in this region is directly connected to the establishment of security and stability in the region after the withdrawal of foreign troops. In such circumstances, Iran's role for the establishment and preservation of stability becomes crucial."

"Non-binding agreements, such as the Nuclear Summit's communiqué ... have the benefit of being developed and implemented quickly. Countries can more easily reach agreement, in the knowledge that an inability to comply will not result in harsh sanction. Yet, these agreements are not toothless, as opponents would claim. By publicly committing to adhere to the communiqué's principles, countries signal their intentions, and can damage their reputation if they fail to deliver. Many countries made national commitments in addition to the communiqué, to which they can be held accountable. For example, Ukraine committed to removing all highly enriched uranium from its territory by the next Summit in 2012. Ukraine's progress can be monitored and pressure brought to bear if its commitment is not met."

Walt: “…..by maintaining a (new) balance you don’t get conflict breaking out and you tilt in favour whichever side seems to be falling behind. At the same time, you do try to discourage conflict whenever possible. You certainly don’t try to control the region yourselves and if the balance breaks down as it did in 1991 and you have to intervene you go in, you get out as quickly as possible. But you don’t try to organize these societies. You don’t try to tell them how to live. You don’t try to tell them how their governments should be organized and you don’t try to transform them at the point of a rifle barrel. This is not disengagement, but it is also not trying to control the region or dictate its political evolution.”

“…we are not going to have a stable long-term situation in the Persian Gulf until the United States and other countries in the region—including Iran—do come to some understanding about the various issues that concern them.  Achieving that goal will require genuine diplomacy…The United States will also have to recognize that Iran’s size, potential power, large population, and its geo-strategic location inevitably make it a major player in the security environment in the Persian Gulf, and ignoring that fact is unrealistic…”