Science, Technology, and Public Policy

Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine illuminated the long profound shadow of nuclear weapons over international security. Russia's nuclear threats have rightfully garnered significant attention because of the unfathomable lethality of nuclear weapons. However, the use of such weapons in Ukraine is only one way—albeit the gravest— that Russia could challenge the global nuclear order. Russia's influence extends deep into the very fabric of this order—a system to which it is inextricably bound by Moscow's position in cornerstone institutions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). From withdrawing from key treaties to stymieing resolutions critical of misconduct, Moscow has demonstrated its ability to challenge the legitimacy, relevance, and interpretations of numerous standards and principles espoused by the West.

David W. Kearn argues that deployment of nuclear weapons cannot rectify a perceived imbalance in conventional forces in the western Pacific.

This chapter appears in Handbook of the Anthropocene: Humans between Heritage and Future.

Nuclear waste epitomizes the Anthropocene. Scientific discovery of nuclear fission in the 1930s ushered in the atomic age. The onset of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy production in the 1940s and 1950s then created a uniquely human problem with planetary implications. Today, 33 countries operate 442 nuclear power reactors, and nine countries possess nearly 13,000 nuclear arms. The result is high-level waste that is dangerously radioactive for millennia to come. Yet, there has never been a permanent waste solution in place. Technically feasible long-term nuclear waste storage options exist, but nearly all governments prefer riskier interim plans hidden from public view and debate. This chapter considers the likelihood of societies addressing the contentious environmental and economic politics of deep geological repositories; and it asks, how long will obfuscation of the risks of this unique Anthropocene challenge continue?

Bruce Schneier, Kennedy School Adjunct Lecturer and an affiliate of the Belfer Center's Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, appeared on GBH News to discuss the legal questions surrounding Montana's TikTok ban.

The Belfer Center Communications Team reached out to policy experts John P. Holdren and Matthew Bunn to reflect on the recent achievement of fusion ignition at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 

The world has grown more dangerous but also less open to arms control measures that could limit some of the dangers. What can be done? Steven E. Miller offers a tour de force overview of both dismal and hopeful trends within arms control over the past decades, in this first paper of a new HCSS series on Arms Control.

Joseph Nye argues that prudence results from the fear of creating unintended consequences in unpredictable systems and can develop into a norm of nonuse or limited use of certain weapons or a norm of limiting targets. Something like this happened with nuclear weapons when the superpowers came close to the brink of nuclear war in 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis. The Limited Test Ban Treaty followed a year later.

In the authors' view, neither formal NATO membership nor nuclear weapons are fitting security options for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. To secure its borders and achieve sustainable peace and stability in Europe, Ukraine should forge a treaty-based strategic alliance directly with the United States.

In recent years, NATO has begun to incorporate some innovative new cyberwarfare games and exercises into its annual wargames. But there is something missing. If NATO wants to see what nation-state hacking is like in the chaotic multiactor online world, it needs to practice fending off some actual hackers.