Science, Technology, and Public Policy

The spread of nuclear weapons is one of the most significant challenges to global security in the twenty-first century. Limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials may be the key to preventing a nuclear war or a catastrophic act of nuclear terrorism. Going Nuclear offers conceptual, historical, and analytical perspectives on current problems in controlling nuclear proliferation. It includes essays that examine why countries seek nuclear weapons as well as studies of the nuclear programs of India, Pakistan, and South Africa.

"Concern over nuclear proliferation is likely to increase in the coming years. Many observers believe that the spread of nuclear weapons to one or two more states will trigger a wave of new nuclear states. More states may turn to nuclear power to meet their energy needs as other sources of energy become more costly or undesirable because they emit carbon that contributes to global climate change. As more nuclear reactors are built, the world's stock of nuclear expertise and fissionable materials is likely to grow."

Jeffery Lewis examines patterns in Chinese defense investments, strategic force deployments, and arms control behavior to assess China's nuclear strategy.

Russia has recently approved legislation allowing it to offer to import foreign spent fuel for storage, reprocessing, or even disposal in Russia. This represents a potentially dramatic development in the decades-long history of efforts to establish internationally collaborative approaches to management of spent fuel and nuclear wastes.

This paper will discuss how much nuclear transparency China can afford to adopt in light of the changing international security context. The work will examine China''s attitude toward nuclear transparency; the possible influence of high-resolution satellite imagery on China''s position; what sorts of nuclear transparency China could accept under international arms control and nonproliferation treaties; and what kind of on-site inspections China could accept at its specific nuclear production facility and site under an FMCT.