Science, Technology, and Public Policy

Joseph Nye writes that the world is increasingly obsessed with the ongoing power struggle between the United States and China. But the technology-driven shift of power away from states to transnational actors and global forces brings a new and unfamiliar complexity to global affairs.

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has published a document from the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs concerning nuclear problems and tensions in the time of COVID-19. The document has been co-signed by a large number of Pugwash colleagues and personalities.

In an event co-hosted by the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship’s (PETR) and the Asia Center, Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook, Executive Director of the Future of Diplomacy Project and the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, moderated a panel discussion on China’s technological rise and its impact on the US-EU relationship. The panel featured Joel Brenner, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for International Studies; Danil Kerimi, Head of Technology Industries Sector, Digital Economy and Global Technology Policy, the World Economic Forum; Meicen Sun, PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Sciences at MIT; and Daniel Weitzner, Founding Director of the Internet Policy Research Initiative. 

Over the last two decades, there has been a dramatic increase in the popularity of financial sanctions as an instrument of US foreign policy to address security threats ranging from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism to human rights violations and transnational crime. Washington’s policymakers have prized these tools for their ability to rapidly apply pressure against foreign targets with few perceived repercussions against American business interests. The problem, however, is that Washington is ignoring a growing tension between financial sanctions designed to support economic statecraft (with non-financial goals) and those designed to protect the international financial system. Confusing the two sends mixed signals to adversaries as well as allies and undermines US credibility and commitment to upholding international banking rules and norms. If Washington cannot reconcile these competing processes, it is unlikely that future administrations will enjoy the same foreign policy levers, leaving the United States at a significant disadvantage.

Although Trump did not outline his legal basis for imposing the tariffs, several analysts anticipated that he was seeking to use the authorities granted him under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act—the legal basis that presidents rely on to impose financial and economic sanctions against WMD proliferators, terrorist organizations, narco-traffickers, and human rights abusers. Mixing trade and immigration policy under the guise of a national security threat, however, may end up deflating Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions campaigns against Iran and North Korea.

Understanding deterrence in cyberspace is often difficult, because  minds remain captured by an image of deterrence shaped by the Cold War: a threat of massive retaliation to a nuclear attack by nuclear means. A better analogy is crime: governments can only imperfectly prevent it.

While traditional trade agreements tend to neglect environmental regulatory cooperation, an Arctic Free Trade Area, including all eight Arctic Council member countries (Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark — including Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States), could set a new and revolutionary precedent.