Science, Technology, and Public Policy

"Washington needs to make a decision about its foreign-policy priorities, if tensions in eastern Ukraine are not reduced. Giving the events in Ukraine priority over all other international developments is a hazardous strategy. Negotiations have gotten us nowhere, and way more assertive steps against Russia are not likely to make Putin give in, since he seems to be determined not to lose his influence over eastern Ukraine and eager to demonstrate Russia's power."

Dr. Eugene Kogan examines the West's approach to Iran and Syria through the lens of coercive diplomacy. Both cases, he argues, offer a chance to revitalize coercion as a tool of American diplomacy.

"Despite these shared characteristics and what could be recognized as common goals, relations between Israel and Iran would not soon lend themselves to cooperation, so much is clear. However, each can take unilateral steps to reduce tension, promote national interests, build confidence and enhance regional security. No such step would likely be identified formally as meaning to serve as reassurance to the other party. Yet, managing expectations will allow the symbolic and concrete uses of such measures not to be negligible."

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations are undertaking an unprecedented operation in Syria: disarming a country of a particular type of weaponry in the midst of a civil war. Professor Findlay discussed the issue in the context of the overlapping legal, institutional, technical, and political demands being made of Syria and the prospects for success of the operation.

Africa's ability to sustain its current growth will depend largely on how quickly it will be able to shift from reliance on traditional commodity markets to modern economic structures that focus on technology-driven development. The focus on innovation is emerging as a key theme in the Africa Union's long-term strategy, Agenda 2063.

This seminar considered how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reacted to nuclear crises. The IAEA often appears not just to have weathered such crises, but to have successfully leaped through windows of opportunity presented by them. This has resulted in periodic expansions of its mandate, capabilities, and resources. The 2011 Fukushima disaster appears to be a puzzling exception, raising the question of what concatenation of factors needs to be present for the IAEA to take advantage of nuclear crises.