Science, Technology, and Public Policy

Last week, President Trump signed a new executive order that paves the way to impose sanctions against any foreign bank that conducts business with North Korea, going well beyond current UN financial sanctions. These so-called secondary sanctions, which are penalties applied to third-party foreign banks (i.e., not directly against North Korean entities), are particularly focused on Chinese banks.

Cyber Security Project Director Michael Sulmeyer and Project Affiliate Amy Chang discuss their observations on China's Approach to cyber after a recent visit to Beijing. Sulmeyer and Chang were part of a small group of American academics and goernment representatives to meet with Chinese counterparts about contemporary issues in cybersecurity.

"Although this phased-approach to sanctions relief under the JCPOA ensures that Iran does not receive benefits without first implementing its nuclear commitments, uncertainties remain. The agreement does not affect U.S. and EU non-nuclear sanctions, such as those that target human rights abuses, support for terrorism, and money laundering. One question is whether or not relief from nuclear-related sanctions will affect the usefulness of non-nuclear sanctions."

In this oped for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Hui Zhang contributes a third article to an international roundtable on reprocessing:

"For US regulators, 2014 was a banner year for collecting fines against sanctions violators, according to The Economist. In June, BNP Paribas—France’s largest bank, and one of the largest in the world—agreed to shell out $9 billion to the US Department of Justice for violating sanctions against Cuba, Iran, and Sudan. This past month, US regulators slapped Germany’s Commerzbank—the country’s second-largest bank, with a similar global presence—with a $1 billion fine, after launching an investigation into its dealings with sanctioned countries. The increases in fines have signaled an aggressive, zero-tolerance policy toward violators, as well as a willingness to use the extraterritorial provisions of sanctions, which allow regulators to punish foreign-based banks..."

The most significant achievement to emerge from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit was a pledge by 35 countries to observe the terms of a joint agreement, known as Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation. Promoted strongly by the chairs of all three nuclear summits—the United States, South Korea, and the Netherlands— the 2014 initiative is an important step towards creating a robust global security system designed to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. Yet China, along with Russia, India, and Pakistan, did not join the pledge. Beijing has not offered any explanations. China not only can join the new initiative, it should join it—because joining is in China’s own national interest.

It is reported that the construction of Taohuajiang Nuclear Power Plant in Hunan Province, China's first inland nuclear power plant, is about to be restarted, after being halted by the State Council which suspended all approvals of the construction of nuclear power plants in March 2011. But public concerns are still the biggest barriers....

"if both the top-down and bottom-up methods of trust building are never going to be risk free, is there a more plausible third option? For example, what if Washington and Beijing forget about trust-building and instead opt for a relationship based on mutual deterrence? Unfortunately, the risks of this option — arms racing, a return to a Cold War-like MAD doctrine, and forever teetering on the brink of conventional conflict — might not just upend US-China relations, they might sabotage regional and global security as well."