Science, Technology, and Public Policy

The author analyzes the policy implications of the U.S. January 2019 Missile Defense Review.

As cyber weapons are incorporated into US military planning, policy makers and field commanders will increasingly confront a core issue: How to formulate the rules of engagement (ROEs) for US forces with regard to military operations that may use such weapons. Michael Sulmeyer, Herbert Lin, and C. Robert Kehler address ROEs from the perspective of US military operators. 

Cyber Security Project Director Michael Sulmeyer discusses the key questions the Trump Administration will confront on military cyberspace operations.

As a young man in the small city of Ogden, Utah, Brandon Parker found himself increasingly interested in the U.S. Air Force, a service where his step-father had made his career. Recruited by the Air Force Academy to play basketball, Parker didn't initially want to become a pilot. But after his initial flight-screening program, he called his mother out of excitement to let her know that he had found exactly what he was meant to do. Until recently, Lieutenant Colonel Parker commanded a nuclear bomber unit based in North Dakota. This year, Parker a research fellow with the Center's International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, is conducting research on nuclear nonproliferation.

Pakistan has developed tactical nuclear weapons to deter India from executing its Cold Start war doctrine. India, however, has disavowed that doctrine. Further, the use of such weapons against Indian troops inside Pakistan would kill and injure countless civilians, while risking massive nuclear retaliation by India. In this International Security article, Jaganath Sankaran argues Pakistan should reconsider the role of tactical nuclear weapons in its military strategy.

Weapons of Mass Destruction or of mass delusion? To nail or derail. Ambiguity in Iran's weapon acquisition dynamics exacerbates mistrust, which is the core reason for the present standoff at the negotiating table. In this paper, the author elucidates the Iranian military's capability and intention by delving into the main componential elements of weapon acquisition.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are not suitable for the Iranian Army, given its non-mechanized nature; its defensive military posture; its current status as a non-nuclear weapon state; and its sufficient conventional preparation to meet its protective security interests. This paper proposes three interlinked policy approaches to resolve the current impasse.