Science, Technology, and Public Policy

On March 15, the U.S. DoJ released an indictment against four Russians in one of the most significant hacking-related law enforcement actions to date. Cyber Security Project's Charley Snyder and Dr. Michael Sulmeyer discuss the indictment and its implications.

"Perfect selective attribution is the most well-balanced in accounting for social justice and security culture needs. The reason being is that it enables all cyber stakeholders with the freedom of choice in disclosing their true personal and/or organizational attributes to an intended recipient, and equally importantly, to what extent. And although each actor is endowed with the power of freedom of choice, every cyber action is also accompanied by the freedom of failure."

"Building on CRI 1.0, Cyber Readiness Index 2.0 examines one hundred twenty-five countries that have embraced, or are starting to embrace, ICT and the Internet and then applies an objective methodology to evaluate each country's maturity and commitment to cyber security across seven essential elements."

Vivek Mohan discusses the National Security Agency, surveillance, and cyberspace norms in a Post-Snowden world. 

"...[A]mong the informed public, fear of misuse of personal information is not limited to a wary eye towards cyber criminals — increasingly, concern has been voiced at the increasing power of the government in electronic surveillance."

In "Decrypting the Fifth Amendment: The Limits of Self-Incrimination in the Digital Era," Vivek Mohan and John Villasenor examine the scope of information protected from compelled self-incriminating disclosure by exploring the boundaries of the contents of the mind. They propose a framework for bringing the foregone conclusion doctrine, which was articulated in 1976, into the digital era, and conclude that the question of what constitutes a "testimonial act" must be revisited to proactively ensure that emerging technologies do not eviscerate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

The risks posed by the proliferation of cyber weapons are gaining wide recognition among security planners. Yet the general reaction of scholars of international relations has been to neglect the cyber peril owing to its technical novelties and intricacies. This attitude amounts to either one or both of two claims: the problem is not of sufficient scale to warrant close inspection, or it is not comprehensible to a non-technical observer. This seminar challenged both assertions.