440 Events

President Jimmy Carter along with George M. Seignious, right, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency briefs community leaders on SALT II at the White House in Washington, Oct. 12, 1979.

AP/Charles Tasnadi

Seminar - Harvard Faculty, Fellows, Staff, and Students

A Strange Arms Debate: Legitimation, Essential Equivalence, and Carter's Nuclear Strategy

Thu., Feb. 1, 2024 | 12:15pm - 1:45pm

One Brattle Square - Room 350

Speaker: Colleen Larkin, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

President Jimmy Carter entered office committed to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy. He espoused the logic of mutually assured destruction and hoped for major arms control progress. Yet by the end of his presidency, he had embraced a competitive nuclear posture and accelerated the arms race. What explains this shift in Carter’s strategy? 

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee &Tea Provided.

An unarmed U.S. Air Force LGM-30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches at 4:36 a.m. PST during an operational test Dec. 17, 2013, from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.

Public Domain/USAF Airman 1st Class Yvonne Morales

Seminar - Open to the Public

The Delicate Balance of Error: Perceived Counterforce Feasibility and the Nuclear Taboo

Thu., Mar. 2, 2023 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: David M. Allison, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

As geopolitical and technological shifts challenge the underpinnings of nuclear deterrence, the implications of a nuclear taboo become increasingly important. Crucially, if the prohibition against nuclear use is binding, improved counterforce capabilities should have no effect on support for use. This seminar presents the results of a series of experiments designed to identify taboo believers and measure the durability of their commitment to nuclear non-use by increasing their perceptions of the military effectiveness of counterforce strikes. 

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar: https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJUvc-uorTkoG9C3zILDI0wrhkBFNJWCkWIU

L-8, a United States Navy blimp whose two-man crew vanished under mysterious circumstances, floats unmanned over San Francisco, California, on August 16, 1942.

U.S. National Archives

Seminar - Open to the Public

Disarmament by Replacement: Balloons, Bio, and Nuclear Weapons

Thu., Dec. 16, 2021 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: Heather Williams, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Why would states give up nuclear weapons? What can historical cases of disarmament teach scholars and policymakers about a pathway to nuclear elimination? One model of disarmament is delegitimization, when humanitarian concerns, legal mechanisms, or changes in international norms cause the elimination of weapons. Another explanation is that disarmament occurs when there is an easing of tensions in geopolitics. But both of these models fail to consider advances in military technology and how these changes inform reliance on certain weaponry. This seminar offers a third model, disarmament by replacement, whereby the relative military utility of a weapon is a decisive factor in disarmament.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJ0scOmqqjsrGd1U6PSgtcfQE4VP3o-yDvUH

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization: Treaty Negotiations in Geneva in 1994.

CTBTO

Seminar - Open to the Public

Veto Players, Treaty Effectiveness, and Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control

Thu., Sep. 16, 2021 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: Stephen Herzog, Senior Researcher in Nuclear Arms Control, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich; Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Why do some treaties face difficult entry-into-force prospects after negotiators agree on their legal provisions? Multilateral nuclear arms control treaties, for example, often face far more contentious journeys to enter into force than their bilateral counterparts. These treaties usually indicate the number of states that must deposit ratification instruments, or may even require participation by specific states. To better understand such delays, Stephen Herzog presents a theory of treaty entry-into-force.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar: https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJUkd-mhqjsvHdH15Dg8RHMId9xyGBgKSpQB 

President Hassan Rouhani with a face mask, 25 July 2020. Rouhani says Iran is retaliating against U.S. sanctions.

Wikimedia CC/Tasnim News Agency

Seminar - Open to the Public

Calibrated Resistance: The Political Dynamics of Iran's Nuclear Policymaking under Trump

Thu., May 20, 2021 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: Abolghasem Bayyenat, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Drawing parallel with domestic and international conditions leading to the successful conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015, this research seeks to put Iran's nuclear policymaking during the Trump administration into perspective and explain why Iran pursued the strategy of calibrated resistance, how this strategy became possible, and why alternative policies became unthinkable or impossible.

Everyone is welcome to join us via Zoom! Please register before the event:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJYqfuGqrjIiE9WN_u4jDdSGCkYNnTLu1_31 

New indigenous PHWR (Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor) under construction, Gujarat, India, 9 June 2016.

Wikimedia CC/Reetesh Chaurasia

Seminar - Open to the Public

Technology Transfer, Control, and Re-invention of the Indian Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor

Thu., Apr. 29, 2021 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: Aditi Verma, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral  Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

The design and creation of complex socio-technical systems require the production and use of both tacit and explicit knowledge. This seminar explores the role of tacit knowledge in the transfer and reinvention of complex, dual-use technologies — in this case, pressurized heavy water reactors — and the implications of the generation of this tacit knowledge for technology control.

Everyone is welcome to join us via Zoom! Please register before the event:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJYucOGgpj4iG9ChfkgqbBwsu3OKLDyJ6Uwh 

President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad makes a public speech at Columbia University in New York City, 24 September 2007.

Wikimedia CC/Daniella Zalcman

Seminar - Open to the Public

Causes and Consequences of Public Cueing in Nuclear Decision-Making

Thu., Jan. 28, 2021 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speakers: Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom; Ariel Petrovics, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

This seminar seeks to examine the causes and consequences of public involvement in nuclear programs in two parts: first, exploring why some leaders involve the public in nuclear discussions, and then assessing shifts in public opinion in response to such cueing. Together, these  parts can help better understand when and how domestic publics can affect the trajectory of their states' nuclear programs.

Everyone is welcome to join us via Zoom! Register before the seminar here: 
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJEpceGprj0qHtYbTdT-_mgWIZVU_VNPqtZa

A deserted classroom in Pripyat, Ukraine, three decades after the Chernobyl disaster, 10 March 2013.

Wikimedia CC/DmytroChapman

Seminar - Open to the Public

Recent Lessons for the Recovery from Acts of Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism

Thu., Oct. 29, 2020 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speaker: Julius Weitzdörfer, Junior Professor of East Asian Law, Hagen University, Germany

Risks stemming from CBRN-terrorism (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) are characterized by relatively low frequency, yet extraordinary potential impact. To help reduce the enormous potential costs associated with radiological and nuclear terrorism, drawing on cases from Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, this seminar seeks to derive and improve recovery policies towards a well-rounded, holistic approach to mitigating the risks of nuclear and radiological terrorism.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Register in advance for this meeting: https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJAoc-yhrjwrEtEXOUTdHqGhMvLscB5VO38u

Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Helsinki in July 2018.

Wikimedia Commons

Seminar - Open to the Public

The Future World Order: Arms Control

Fri., Sep. 25, 2020 | 12:30pm - 2:00pm

Online

The Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs will host a discussion on the future of arms control, as part of a new HKS series on The Future World Order.  The participants will be Emma Belcher (Ploughshares Fund), Matthew Bunn (Belfer Center/Managing the Atom) and Steven E. Miller (Belfer Center/International Security Program).  Professor Stephen Walt (Belfer Center/ISP) will moderate.

Cascade of gas centrifuges used to produce enriched uranium in the U.S. gas centrifuge plant in Piketon, Ohio, 1984.

DOE Photo

Seminar - Open to the Public

A-Bomb for the People: Domestic Drivers of Nuclear Latency

Thu., June 4, 2020 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speakers: Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom; Ariel Petrovics, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Though only nine states in the world today are believed to possess their own nuclear weapons, many more states have the capability to pursue a nuclear bomb if they choose. This capability – or nuclear latency – has recently drawn attention in international relations scholarship, which largely focuses on the effects of latency on international deterrence, compellence, and bargaining. While this research helps explain the security benefits and motives that may drive states to pursue nuclear capabilities short of the bomb, it has yet to determine how domestic politics play into these considerations. This project explores how public opinion factors into state decisions to pursue or forgo latent nuclear capabilities. In doing so, it seeks to offer new insight into when and why latency can become a salient topic to domestic audiences, and the implications of these domestic drivers for the future of nonproliferation.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJwuc-qrqj4pG90vSX2_VoG35zaE6L6mkPQt