Managing the Atom

April 26, 2024, marks 38 years since the accident at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant in then-Soviet Ukraine. Still bearing the tragic distinctions of the worst nuclear accident in history, Chornobyl exposed thousands of people to ionized radiation, creating lingering humanitarian effects as well as severe social and political dislocations. By exposing the dysfunction and duplicity of the Soviet regime in Moscow, Chornobyl also contributed to the collapse of the Soviet empire. Some three decades later, the Chornobyl Power Plant and the exclusion zone around it, was occupied and vandalized by Russian military forces, dispatched by another ruler in Moscow to wage war against Ukraine. To interrogate relations between political power and human dimensions of nuclear security, we delighted to host a conversation with Adam Higginbotham, the author of an award-winning book Midnight in Chernobyl.

Speaker: David Kearn, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

The book project seeks to explain the divergence of views of within the strategic community after the signing of the SALT I Accords and the subsequent shift in U.S. strategic nuclear policy away from "assured destruction" to "nuclear warfighting" throughout the 1970s and culminating in the Reagan administrations "prevailing strategy."

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee &Tea Provided.

Speaker: Colleen Larkin, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

President Jimmy Carter entered office committed to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy. He espoused the logic of mutually assured destruction and hoped for major arms control progress. Yet by the end of his presidency, he had embraced a competitive nuclear posture and accelerated the arms race. What explains this shift in Carter’s strategy? 

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee &Tea Provided.

Redressing Nuclear Harm: Transitional Justice in the Nuclear Age

Nuclear deterrence and disarmament discussions often center on potential future use and threats of use of nuclear weapons. Attention is growing, however, on the harm that nuclear weapons have already done, mostly focused on the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and on nuclear testing impacts. This seminar offers a nuclear justice lens derived from concepts of transitional justice (TJ).

Rabia Akhtar presented at the weekly MTA Seminar. 

Her talk was titled: "Strategic Stability, Crisis Communication, and Shared Nuclear Responsibilities in South Asia"

Speaker: Ambassador Zamir Akram, Author, The Security Imperative: Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrence & Diplomacy

Ambassador Akram will discuss his new book, which is an in-depth study of the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear program until it became a reality despite all the international pressures against it and the challenges along the way.

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee, Tea, & Light Refreshments Provided.

We welcome you to join us for the weekly MTA seminar with Dmitry Stefanovich.

Harvard and local affiliates are welcome to join us the One Brattle Building, room 401. All others are welcome to join via Zoom (registration link here).

Dmitry will present:

Hypersonic Weapons, Missile Defense and US-RUSSIA Strategic Stability
 

Leonor Tomero, Visiting Lecturer with the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, and former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense will present, "The US Innovation imperative and the future of the global strategic balance."

The global nuclear order that comprises nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation, and disarmament is often viewed as discriminatory and increasingly castigated as unjust. Few states got to develop and deploy nuclear weapons in the name of their own security and that of their allies. Most are prohibited from doing so by the international nonproliferation regime. All stand to lose if a nuclear exchange takes place. Russia’s war against Ukraine underscored the inequities and injustices in the global nuclear order built on hierarchical spheres of (in)security. How to define injustice in nuclear affairs? How sustainable is an unjust global nuclear order? At what cost can it be maintained in its present form, and how can it be long tolerated by the future generations? The panel brings together scholars to critically reflect on past, ongoing, and future nuclear injustices – in the context of the war in Ukraine and beyond – to assess the main tensions and pave the way for a research agenda beyond the usual boundaries of the nuclear policy field and community.

Speaker: Matthew Hartwell, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

When and why is population protection considered an element of U.S. nuclear deterrence? While civil defense played a negligible role in nuclear strategy throughout the early part of the Cold War, beginning in the late 1950s, the limits to the program materialized twice as a potential gap in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance. Examining the public and congressional reaction to the programs, this seminar will demonstrate how domestic political barriers undermined the Kennedy and Reagan administrations' attempts to alter the role of population protection in U.S. nuclear strategy.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJ0ld-qrrzkpHtGKfE1mVLLIZ2s8dLCBcSp1