Managing the Atom

Speaker: David Kearn, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

The book project seeks to explain the divergence of views of within the strategic community after the signing of the SALT I Accords and the subsequent shift in U.S. strategic nuclear policy away from "assured destruction" to "nuclear warfighting" throughout the 1970s and culminating in the Reagan administrations "prevailing strategy."

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee &Tea Provided.

Speaker: Colleen Larkin, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

President Jimmy Carter entered office committed to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy. He espoused the logic of mutually assured destruction and hoped for major arms control progress. Yet by the end of his presidency, he had embraced a competitive nuclear posture and accelerated the arms race. What explains this shift in Carter’s strategy? 

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee &Tea Provided.

A Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) seminar with Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, Postdoctoral Fellow and Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo.

RSVP to receive Zoom link. Please note that this event will begin at 9:30 and end at 11:00 a.m., half an hour earlier than previous MTA seminars.

Speakers: Giles David Arceneaux, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Kyungwon Suh, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University

The deterrent capacity of a state's nuclear forces is dependent upon the platforms and delivery systems that constitute the arsenal. The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not provide a robust deterrent and nuclear states cannot credibly deter potential adversaries with nuclear threats in the absence of adequate delivery capabilities. The project presents a new dataset that measures the possession of seven nuclear delivery platforms across all nuclear powers from 1945–2019, including: submarine-launched missiles, strategic land-mobile missiles, strategic solid-fuel missiles, nuclear cruise missiles, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, long-range ballistic missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar: https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJcsf-6uqTwoHdZZJ3qqoP1Ohy78rsXBc5en

Speaker:  Cameron Tracy, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

States often spend vast sums on weapon production, yet have trouble mustering the resources necessary to eliminate stockpiled weapons for arms control and disarmament purposes. Stockpile reductions have proven particularly challenging with respect to weapons of mass destruction, for which weaponizability is embedded in materials rather than assembled devices. Their elimination commonly requires expensive, technologically demanding processes. U.S. chemical weapon and weapons plutonium stockpile reduction efforts provide useful case studies for investigation of the factors governing the success of reductions programs, as they faced similar challenges yet yielded divergent outcomes. This project involves comparative analysis of both reductions programs, focusing on the technical, organizational, and sociopolitical contexts that aided or hindered elimination.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

There is a lingering disagreement among scholars on how the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) affects nonproliferation and disarmament outcomes, in particular the political motivations of states to acquire or renounce nuclear weapons. Drawing on constructivist scholarship, this research project conceptualizes a range of normative mechanisms through which international norms and regimes could affect domestic political deliberations and proceeds to examine them in the cases of nuclear disarmament of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

For over a decade the United States has sought to develop non-nuclear weapons that could hit distant targets in a short period of time. Debate about this Conventional Prompt Global Strike Program has been dominated by one issue—the possibility that Russia (or another observing state) might mistake one of these weapons for a nuclear weapon and launch a nuclear response. Unfortunately, this narrow focus ignores other, more serious strategic risks as well as strategic benefits.

Please join the Managing the Atom/Defense and Intelligence Projects for a screening of the classic 1964 film, Dr. Strangelove: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb on the 50th anniversary of its release.This co-sponsored event will be followed by a brief discussion on the most important questions the film raises, moderated by Research Fellows and United States Air Force Lieutenant Colonels Jay Folds (MTA/ISP) and Douglas Gosney (ISP).

Pizza and refreshments provided. Please join us - Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

This presentation asks why states without nuclear weapons fight opponents with nuclear weapons. The presentation critically examines the claim that states believe opponents will not use nuclear weapons in conflict.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

This seminar will examine the prospects for further nuclear arms reductions between the United States and Russia, including the possibility that negotiations might be expanded to weapons not limited by the New START Treaty. The seminar will cover U.S. and Russian differences over missile defense and how those might be resolved to allow a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement for Europe.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.