1316 Items

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, right, poses with South Korean President Moon Jae-in for a photo at the border village of Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone. April 27, 2018 (Korea Summit Press Pool via AP).

Korea Summit Press Pool via AP

Analysis & Opinions - The Hill

First, Cooperate on Nuclear Safety in the Korean Peninsula

| Oct. 06, 2018

Absent since the restart of dialogue with North Korea is any discussion on inter-Korean nuclear safety cooperation, despite concerns over possible safety risks at the North Korean nuclear complex. Inattention to the facility could have dire consequences for the peninsula: radioactive fallout does not recognize borders.

Blogtrepreneur/Flickr

Blogtrepreneur/Flickr

Journal Article - Nonproliferation Review

Solving the Jurisdictional Conundrum: How U.S. Enforcement Agencies Target Overseas Illicit Procurement Networks Using Civil Courts

| September 2018

Over the past two decades, the United States has increasingly turned to targeted sanctions and export restrictions, such as those imposed against Iran and North Korea, in order to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction. One vexing problem, however, is how to contend with jurisdictional hurdles when the violations occur overseas, in countries that are unable or unwilling to assist US enforcement efforts. To solve this problem, US prosecutors are turning to strategies with significant extraterritorial implications—that is, exercising legal authority beyond national borders. One such tool is to use civil legal procedures to seize assets linked to sanctions or export-control violations in jurisdictions that lack cooperative arrangements with US enforcement agencies. While this may be an attractive strategy to bolster enforcement efforts against overseas illicit procurement, using such tools is not without consequence. This article explores the political, legal, and technical implications of enforcing extraterritorial controls against overseas non-state actors by exploring the recent uses of civil-asset forfeiture against Iranian and North Korean procurement networks.

Two-thousand rials

DAVID HOLT/Flickr

Analysis & Opinions - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Will Anti-Money Laundering Reform in Iran Matter?

| Sep. 14, 2018

Next month, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—an intergovernmental body that sets and promotes worldwide anti-money laundering standards—will make a key decision on whether or not to lift Iran’s probationary status or place the country back on its blacklist. If put back onto the blacklist, member states would be asked to employ financial countermeasures that range from requiring extra scrutiny of Iranian-linked accounts to shutting down certain types of banking networks.

President Trump speaking about Iran at the White House in October 2017 (White House Photo).

White House Photo

Analysis & Opinions - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Where Does Trump Get the Power to Reimpose Sanctions?

| Aug. 15, 2018

Last week, the Trump administration reimposed unilateral sanctions against Iran. This comes after the administration announced its intention to withdraw from the Iran deal in April, despite compelling reasons not to. Like most of America’s sanctions regimes, Trump’s order to reimpose sanctions rests on authority granted under a little-known and even less understood statute that gives the president sweeping authority to regulate certain aspects of international trade and commerce: the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

People on paddleboats in Gorky Park in Moscow. July 12, 2018 (Marco Verch/Flickr).

Marco Verch/Flickr

Analysis & Opinions - The Hill

In Gorky Park, With Nuclear Worries

| Aug. 13, 2018

Today, both Russia and the United States are modernizing their nuclear forces to keep these threats robust for decades to come — though their forces’ total numbers are limited by treaties (thank goodness). The U.S. program is expected to cost $1.2 trillion over 30 years, and the Trump administration has added new, smaller nuclear weapons that critics warn might seem more usable should war come. Russia’s program includes entirely new types of strategic weapons, from an intercontinental torpedo designed to blow up U.S. coastal cities to a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile.

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Azharsofii/Wikimedia).

Azharsofii/Wikimedia

Journal Article - European Journal of International Security

Exploring the Use of 'Third Countries' in Proliferation Networks: The Case of Malaysia

| Aug. 10, 2018

‘Third countries’ are frequently exploited by those involved in networks to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies, allowing procurement agents to obscure the end user or vendor located in the proliferating state, and to deceive industry, export licensing officials, and intelligence services. While ‘third countries’ frequently feature in illicit transactions, the academic literature exploring the roles played by entities in these jurisdictions is limited. Building on the sanctions busting literature, this article proposes a loose typology considering the ways in which third countries can be exploited by proliferation networks. The typology is illustrated using three cases involving entities based in Malaysia – A. Q. Khan’s nuclear black market network, and Iran and North Korea’s efforts to procure and market WMD-related and military goods. These cases are used to generate insights into proliferators’ selection of ‘third country’ hubs. The article argues that while exploitation of third countries by proliferation networks is a similar, but distinct phenomenon to trade-based sanctions busting, hubs of both activities share characteristics. Furthermore, the article argues that other factors beyond the lax regulatory environment, such as level of development, and personal connections, are often as important in driving the decisions of proliferation networks. The article concludes with implications for nonproliferation policy.

U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin during their joint news conference at the Presidential Palace in Helsinki, Finland. July 16, 2018 (Pablo Martinez Monsivais/Associated Press).

Pablo Martinez Monsivais/Associated Press

Analysis & Opinions - The Hill

The Sobering Reasons Congress Must Step Up On Arms Control

| July 19, 2018

Congress is asserting itself by passing additional sanctions to hold Russia accountable for its meddling in U.S. elections. Now it needs to step up its work on arms control — not despite the current tensions with Russia, but because of them.

Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump meet at the 2017 G-20 Hamburg Summit (Kremlin.ru/Wikimedia Commons).

Kremlin.ru/Wikimedia Commons

Analysis & Opinions - The Boston Globe

Trump and Putin Face an Urgent Arms Control Deadline in Helsinki

| July 12, 2018

As US-Russian relations continue to deteriorate, Presidents Trump and Putin appear eager to find common ground on arms control when they meet in Helsinki on Monday. The reason for their urgency is clear: The framework that has stabilized the US-Russian strategic balance since the fall of the Soviet Union is in danger of collapsing.