Managing the Atom

The smoke is still clearing from the drone strike that killed Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani, and from the Iranian retaliation against U.S. bases in Iraq, and any conclusions have to be tentative ones. But the history of U.S.-Iran conflict points to a narrow, and possibly dangerous, set of choices ahead.

In a dangerous world, every US use of military force should be backed up by a careful calculation of risks and a strategy to cope with the adversary’s response. Neither risk-balancing nor strategy is apparent in President Trump’s decision to kill Major General Qassem Soleimani, leader of the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. With that killing — and Iran’s announcement it would exact a “harsh revenge” — there is a real danger the Middle East will slide even further into the fires of war.

Over the last two decades, there has been a dramatic increase in the popularity of financial sanctions as an instrument of US foreign policy to address security threats ranging from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism to human rights violations and transnational crime. Washington’s policymakers have prized these tools for their ability to rapidly apply pressure against foreign targets with few perceived repercussions against American business interests. The problem, however, is that Washington is ignoring a growing tension between financial sanctions designed to support economic statecraft (with non-financial goals) and those designed to protect the international financial system. Confusing the two sends mixed signals to adversaries as well as allies and undermines US credibility and commitment to upholding international banking rules and norms. If Washington cannot reconcile these competing processes, it is unlikely that future administrations will enjoy the same foreign policy levers, leaving the United States at a significant disadvantage.

Julius Weitzdörfer’s earliest childhood memories are the major global events of 1986—the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion and the Chernobyl disaster. Looking back, he realizes that these events must have contributed to shaping his later research interests in managing technological risks. 

• Russians View Terrorists as Third Most Probable Source of Nuclear Attack
• U.S. Adopts New Strategy for Countering of WMD Terrorism
• Elbe Group Calls for U.S.-Russian Cooperation against Terrorism
• Belfer Center Experts on Combatting Complacency about Nuclear Terrorism
• Can Threat Emanating from Jihadists of Central Asia Have a WMD Dimension?
• NTI and CENESS on Radiological Risks in Central Asia
• Hecker Assesses Probability of Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism
• Luxembourg Forum: It’s Vital for US and Russia to Intensify Cooperation to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Recent scholarship on nuclear proliferation finds that many forms of nuclear assistance increase the odds that recipient states pursue nuclear weapons programs. While these studies may help us understand select cases of proliferation, they overshadow the role of nuclear supply in bolstering global nonproliferation efforts. After the risks of nuclear assistance became well-known following India’s nuclear explosion in 1974, most major suppliers conditioned their assistance on recipients joining nonproliferation agreements. Case studies of states’ decision-making regarding these agreements illustrate how the provision of nuclear technology has been an effective tool in persuading states to join such agreements, the most important of which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). By joining the NPT, states strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and increase the costs of any potential future decision to proliferate. The offer of nuclear assistance has done far more to bolster global nuclear nonproliferation efforts than recent research suggests.

This paper surveys the existing tools for maintaining and strengthening nuclear security in the Asia-Pacific region, identifies regional tools that currently do not play such a role, but conceivably could, and considers whether new tools might be created.

Mariana Budjeryn recounts Ukraine's surrender of its inherited nuclear arsenal and the signing of the Budapest Memorandum by the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia. While the memorandum did not specify the assistance Ukraine was to receive if it became a victim of aggression, Ukrainians were led to believe that the United States would uphold its commitments to their security in the time of need, as Ukraine upheld its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation norms.

The ACDA’s existence meant arms control and disarmament would not become lost in bureaucratic fights between other departments.