The Russian Duma's ratification of the START II nuclear arms treaty, following president-elect Vladimir Putin's calls for even deeper cuts in Russia's nuclear arsenals, presents a major opportunity for the Clinton administration to advance American national security interests. On the basis of conversations with Russian experts and officials in Moscow, we are confident that Putin would be receptive to a bold proposal for a joint Russian-American initiative to prevent terrorist theft of Russian nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials.
In a speech at a nuclear weapons center on March 31, Putin said that his government should work to "free the world from piles of excess weapons." Calling for further cuts and stepped-up efforts to streamline Russia's nuclear capabilities, he said: "Our aim is to make our nuclear weapons complex more safe and effective."
We recently served as members of a task force that engaged 100 experts in a review of nuclear security today— after a decade of vigorous engagement supported by the Nunn-Lugar program and related legislation. Despite a decade of effort, the risks of "loose nukes" are larger today than they were when these efforts began. U.S. programs have had positive results, but declines in Russia's economy and in the government's ability to control anything— from money to nuclear materials— has had larger negative consequences. The good news is that Russians are ready to engage in more joint efforts to secure Russia's nuclear materials.
Russians' awareness of their vulnerability to terrorism has been raised dramatically by recent experience. Last summer's attack upon Russian territory in Dagestan by rogue warlords operating from Chechen territory; the bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow and other cities that killed more than 300 people; and threats by fighters in Chechnya to attack nuclear power plants and other facilities in Russia— all have given terrorism a terrifying face for ordinary Russians. Polls from last November find that 90 percent of Russians surveyed fear a terrorist attack on nuclear facilities, and 86 percent fear that a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist could be used against Russia.
The American public also recognizes the threat. A September Wall Street Journal-NBC News poll showed that the threat of terrorist acts on U.S. soil ranks second among Americans' biggest fears.
Our task force identified a number of serious initiatives that can reduce this danger. At the top of our recommendations are:
* Buy and take all the nuclear weapons material Russia is prepared to sell. In addition to highly enriched uranium (HEU) purchases, the U.S. government should buy all available Russian HEU, which, when blended with low-enriched uranium, becomes proliferation resistant and commercially valuable. Under the current agreement, less than half of Russia's HEU would be blended over the next 20 years. Plutonium also should be purchased, but that will require more substantial public subsidies since it currently has no commercial use.
* Remove potential bomb material from the most vulnerable sites in Russia. Caches of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, sufficient for making dozens of bombs, still can be found at many facilities across Russia. As part of a renewed "buy and secure" campaign, potential bomb material should be consolidated in central, more secure storage facilities.
* Accelerate the blending down of highly enriched uranium. The United States should provide the capital investment and financial incentives for Russia to blend down all excess HEU in the next four years. For an investment of approximately $ 500 million, we could get all of the excess Russian HEU blended to nonweapons-usable forms within Putin's first term.
These deals should be accompanied by Russia's agreement not to produce additional nuclear materials. Also, given Europe's proximity to Russia and Japan's experience as a target of terrorism, our allies should share the costs. July's G-8 summit in Okinawa provides a setting in which these deals could be done.
Mutual concern about terrorism and a new, energetic leader in Moscow who seems to be willing to address his nation's nuclear reality present a rare opportunity for sharply reducing dangers to Americans, Russians and the world.