In the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was set up by Article 12 to achieve two-fold objectives: to help Annex I countries to meet their emission targets in a cost-effective way and to support non-Annex I countries in achieving the goal of sustainable development. Although technology transfer is not a requirement for CDM, experience shows that CDM may contribute significantly to technology transfer. However, it is difficult to induce large-scale technology transfer through CDM in its present form. The project-specific nature of CDM leads to high transaction costs and makes it difficult to create economies of scale and pool risks across projects of the same type. Thus CDM is not effective in attracting more low-carbon investors. The CDM does not address the competitiveness concerns of the private sector in developed countries.This paper addresses these challenging issues by proposing an enhanced CDM regime with greater emphasis on technology transfer from developed countries to developing countries.

"...[T]his paper provides a new multi-stage climate policy framework based on a revised Global Development Right (GDR) calculation, and proposes a feasible hybrid negotiation framework from the perspective of developing countries. According to the "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" principle in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), we recognize that due to the historical emissions contributions and different pace of industrialization and growth around the world, a successful international climate policy needs to balance equity and efficiency and eventually achieve an overall carbon mitigation target."

This paper provides a quantitative comparison of the main architectures for an agreement on climate policy. Possible successors to the Kyoto protocol are assessed according to four criteria: economic efficiency; environmental effectiveness; distributional implications; and their political acceptability which is measured in terms of feasibility and enforceability. The ultimate aim is to derive useful information for designing a future agreement on climate change control.

Any climate change agreement ought to be negotiated and updated later on, as we learn more about the costs and benefits of abatements. Anticipating such negotiations, countries may distort domestic decisions (regarding R&D and adaptation, for example) trying to increase their future bargaining power. This can make a situation with an agreement worse than no agreement at all — unless one specifies rules governing the negotiation process. This paper argues that harmonization and the use of formulas, the time span for the agreement, the default outcome if the negotiations should fail, the voting rule and a minimum participation requirement can all be efficiency enhancing rules. Each rule would be more credible and efficient if the climate agreement is linked to a trade agreement, since that would discourage members from opting out or free-riding if they should be adversely affected by the rules.

"Despite the uncertainties about the nature and stringency of national emission reduction commitments, some things are clear: the international negotiations not only will include national targets and timetables, but also will have to take account of diverse policies and measures undertaken by individual nations, including those inside the current Kyoto group, as well as among developing countries. The evaluation of these diverse policies poses a number of challenges. For example, how can one assess the fairness of the relative contributions of different nations? And even if fairness is agreed upon, how is it possible to determine the credibility of the commitments?"

"To estimate the emissions reductions and costs of a climate policy, analysts usually compare a policy scenario with a baseline scenario of future economic conditions without the policy. Both scenarios require assumptions about the future course of numerous factors such as population growth, technical change, and non-climate policies like taxes. The results are only reliable to the extent that the future turns out to be reasonably close to the assumptions that went into the model.

In this paper we examine the effects of unanticipated macroeconomic shocks to growth in developing countries or a global financial crisis on the performance of three climate policy regimes: a globally-harmonized carbon tax; a global cap and trade system; and the McKibbin-Wilcoxen hybrid...."

A successful global effort to mitigate global climate change will require substantial cooperation between developed and developing countries. Even as the bulk of the developed world is at some stage of enacting significant domestic regulations to meet global stabilization goals, growth in developing country emissions will easily thwart those goals unless a cooperative solution is found. We argue that there is a wide range of options that should be pursued, including domestic policy reforms in developing countries, expanded financing mechanisms to address incremental costs, and diplomatic efforts in a variety of forums, all aimed at increasing developing country mitgation efforts over time.

"The global climate regime and the global trade policy regime are on a collision course. National efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) instill among environmentalists fears of leakage and among businesspeople fears of lost competitiveness. Policy-makers respond to these fears. In 2008, legislative attempts in both Washington, DC, and Brussels to enact long-term targets for reduced emission of GHGs included provisions for possible penalties against imports from countries perceived as non-participating. Trade measures, if well designed, could in theory be WTO-compatible...."

This paper considers opportunities for improved and expanded international development and transfer of climate technologies. It characterizes the economic scale of the climate technology challenge, and it reviews the pattern of public and private R&D and the rationale for R&D policies within the global innovation system. The paper clarifies the importance of options for inducing technology market demand through domestic GHG pricing, international trade, and international development assistance. It then turns to upstream innovation strategies, including international coordination and funding of climate technology R&D, and knowledge transfer through intellectual property. The paper concludes that a successful international effort to accelerate and then sustain the rate of development and transfer of GHG mitigation technologies must harness a diverse set of markets and institutions beyond those explicitly related to climate, to include those for energy, trade, development, and intellectual property.

The current climate regime, which focuses on reducing (net) emissions, can be improved in two ways. First, by breaking up the problem, and addressing each part separately, but treating all parts as a system of agreements, new possibilities emerge for enforcement. Second, by incorporating adaptation, "geoengineering," and the risks associated with mitigation options (such as long term storage of nuclear waste and carbon dioxide) in a portfolio of agreements, more opportunities open up for risk management. A portfolio system of climate treaties would be superior to today's single-track architecture.