The Iran nuclear deal was officially implemented on Saturday, as Iran successfully fulfilled its initial key nuclear commitments and the international community relieved major sanctions, including unfreezing about $100 billion of Iranian money. Implementation Day was met with applause from deal supporters in the U.S. and Iran, while critics have raised questions about whether Iran will adhere to its requirements and how it will flex its newfound economic power. Also in recent days, the U.S. and Iran agreed to a prisoner swap that led to the freedom of Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian and others, and negotiated the release of American sailors detained in Iran. What does the arrival of Implementation Day mean for Iran’s nuclear program and nuclear nonproliferation, and how does it bode for the future of U.S.-Iran relations? We asked Belfer Center experts to weigh in on these and related questions.

Nicholas Burns, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center, argues in The New York Times that with the likely passage of the Iran nuclear deal, the President needs to put in place a strategy to continue to check Iran regionally and to ensure that they do not build a nuclear weapon. He suggests the US should reaffirm the American commitment to defend the Gulf Region from any aggressor, clarify that the United States will use force if Iran violates the deal and seeks to build a nuclear weapon, renew US-Israeli security cooperation and mend fences with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and reaffirm US commitment to maintaining a coalition of states opposed to Iran's regional and nuclear ambitions. 

Dennis Ross, International Council Member of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and David Petraeus, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center, write in The Washington Post that it is necessary for the United States to continue to project a strong deterrent to Iran in order to insure that it does not develop nuclear weapons after the expiration of the most stringent controls of the nuclear deal. Specifically, they argue that the United States should provide Israel with the Massive Ordinance Penetrator bomb, capable of destroying the most heavily defending Iranian nuclear sites, in order to strengthen the deterrent against trying to break out and built a nuclear weapon.

Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, argues in The Boston Globe that contrary to certain statements, the Iran nuclear agreement actually does not constrain American or Israeli abilities to launch military options against Iran's nuclear facilities if needed in the future. He argues that the intelligence gained from monitoring the Iranian program will help targeting Iranian nuclear sites, and as a result the possibility for a military strike on Iran after the deal would be more likely to be successful than a military strike now.

Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in The Atlantic that despite criticism, the current nuclear deal with Iran is the best option facing the United States for trying to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. He argues that there is a very little possibility of other countries returning to the bargaining table if the US stops the agreement, and states that despite the continued destabilizing actions of Iran in the region, the agreement presents the best chance of foreclosing the pathways to an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Daniel Sobelman, research fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in Foreign Policy that the Houthi rebels in Yemen are following a similar operational strategy to the one pursued by Hezbollah during its 2006 war with Israel. He argues that the Houthis share operational links with Hezbollah. These links between the organizations can be best discerned by analyzing the rhetoric of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, who has stated that Hezbollah's fight against Israel in 2006 provides a model for organizations and groups operating against militarily superior forces. In this model, the actions of the Houthis to attack Saudi border towns and garrisons are part of a broader strategy of forcing Saudi Arabia to deescalate its air campaign or force it to engage with ground forces, an outcome that would favor the Houthis. He concludes that while it is impossible to know what the exact effects of the Houthi retaliatory measures against Saudi targets, it is clear that more than air power will needed to end the Houthi threat to Saudi Arabia.

Gene Gerzhoy, Research Fellow with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in the Washington Post that history demonstrates that the United States has many options for both pursuing diplomacy with adversaries while preventing nervous allies from seeking nuclear deterrents of their own, a dilemma the U.S. faces now in its relations with Saudi Arabia over the nuclear negotiations with Iran. He argues that in the 1960s the United States was able to use coercive diplomacy to pressure West Germany to not pursue nuclear weapons by threatening to withdraw American troops helping defend West Germany from the Soviet Union. He suggests that the U.S. could use a combination of coercive pressure and security reassurances to prevent Saudi Arabia from acquiring nuclear capabilities after the signing of a nuclear deal with Iran.

Payam Mohseni, Director of the Iran Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Dennis Ross, International Council Member, Belfer Center, and David Sanger, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center, discuss for The New York Times the stakes in the current Iran nuclear negotiations, including the risks of lifting sanctions on Iran, the difficulties in reaching an agreement, and the importance of the current political moment for both Iran and the U.S. in reaching a deal.

Dina Esfandiary, Research Associate at King's College, London, and Ariane Tabatabai, Research Associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, write for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that an Iranian nuclear deal is unlikely to spark a major surge in developing nuclear technology in the countries of the Middle East. They look specifically at the cases of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates and examine the technical, diplomatic, and political challenges to each one to actively pursuing nuclear weapons programs, and argue from this assessment that a successful nuclear deal with Iran will not spur a nuclear arms race in the region. 

Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Gary Samore, Director of Research at the Belfer Center, highlight the best analysis pieces on the recent framework agreement with Iran over its nuclear program. Specifically, they break down analysis pieces that focus on the agreement itself, its regional implications, and the domestic political response to it.