David Sanger, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center and the National Security Correspondent for the New York Times, writes in the New York Times on the shifting course of American diplomacy with Iran during the negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. From the earliest meetings facilitated by the Sultan of Oman with Iranian officials, to the final hours of the tense negotiations in Vienna, he describes the shifting priorities and views of the American and Iranian diplomatic teams, and how compromises on sanctions and centrifuges allowed the deal to come together.

Nicholas Burns, Professor of Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School and former Undersecretary of State for Policy, argues in the Financial Times that the nuclear agreement with Iran is the best option available for the West currently. He argues that in the absence of an agreement, international sanctions and pressure would have collapsed while monitoring the Iranian program would have been significantly weakened. He counters arguments that this will lead to a broader rapprochement with due to the competition in Iran between the pragmatists who are interested in discussion with the West, and the hardliners, who prefer continued confrontation. He also suggests that Iran's influence in the Sunni world will force the United States to confront Iran in the region in the future, further precluding a drastic improvement of relations.

William Tobey, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in the Wall Street Journal that the nuclear agreement with Iran does not provide stringent enough verification measures to ensure that Iran is abiding by the agreement. Specifically, he notes that in some cases, as many as twenty four days may elapse before inspectors arrive at a site to investigate, which will give Iran time to hide evidence of wrongdoing. He also argues that the deal fails by not requiring Iran to submit a full declaration of the past military dimensions of the program, meaning any actions that could have been carried out in the explicit pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Without this declaration, he argues, the agreement does not set a baseline for inspections, making it much harder for the deal to be enforced.

Nicholas Burns, Professor of Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the implications of the nuclear agreement with Iran. He stated that both the Bush and Obama Administrations had pursued complementary policies that have helped the United States reach the final stage of negotiations, and suggested that a deal that sets stringent controls on the Iranian nuclear program in line with the standards laid out in the Lausanne Framework would be worth congressional support. He argued that the interim agreement with Iran froze the Iranian program, gave the US and its allies verification tools to monitor compliance, and a mechanism to reimpose sanctions on Iran if it violates the accord. Finally, he argued that unilaterally walking away from the table would hurt American global standing, and would foreclose the possibility of coming to a negotiated agreement, which he suggested was still the best option for ensuring that Iran does not produce a nuclear weapon.

Matthew Bunn, Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom, discusses his perspective towards the Iranian nuclear agreement. He describes how the deal restricts Iran's nuclear program, giving the world time to continue to respond to the Iranian challenge, and how the agreement, while not perfect, is a significant step in rolling back aspects of the Iranian program. He suggests that while mutual hostility handicapped talks, the presence of technical experts alongside political officials was crucial in having the final agreement come together. he suggests that while the deal may not solve all problems in US-Iran relations, it does leave the door open to future cooperation on issues of mutual concern.

Nuclear negotiations with Iran have apparently reached an impasse over the future of United Nations arms restrictions against Iran. What are these embargoes, and why is there controversy?

Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Gary Samore, Director of Research at the Belfer Center, identify inThe National Interest four myths about the sanctions structure on Iran due to its nuclear program. Specifically, they argue that not all sanctions on Iran will be removed after a nuclear deal, that the sanctions are not clearly delineated between "nuclear" and "non-nuclear" related sanctions, that some sanctions on Iran such as a conventional arms embargo and targeting the Iranian ballistic missile program are not closely linked to the nuclear program but are addressing areas of continuing concern for the United States, and that in a final agreement many sanctions may be lifted, but will not be permanently removed, as they are codified in Congressional legislation.

Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in The Atlantic that the most important fact to remember when approaching the Iranian nuclear talks is to remember what American objectives are: to stop Iran verifiably and interruptidly short of a nuclear bomb. He also uses history to make the case against claims against negotiating with Iran, arguing that arms control agreements are a part of the American diplomatic, military, and political toolbox to address national security threats, that negotiating with "evil" regimes can still help preserve American security, that strict verification measures can mitigate the risk of cheating on agreements, that the United States is perfectly capable of negotiating arms control with states it is also engaged in proxy conflicts with, and that the United States can still negotiate with a regime that it seeks to undermine. 

Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in The National Interest that past American arms control agreements can help illuminate important lessons to consider when assessing the potential nuclear agreement with Iran. Specifically, he argues that arms control agreements can accomplish American national security objectives without resorting to war, no deal can result without compromise, arms control agreements lower the overall possibility of nuclear war, future agreements should not be scuttled by the past difficulty in negotiating with North Korea, and an agreement that meets the conditions necessary for maintaining American objectives is the most responsible option for maintaining American national security.

Alan Kuperman, Associate Professor at the University of Texas, Austin, and former research fellow at the Belfer Center, responds to Graham Allison and Gary Samore’s analysis of his June 23 op-ed in the New York Times.