Letter to Presidents Bush and Putin before summit meeting

In light of the new and emerging challenges posed by international terrorism, we believe that it is now more important than ever that the U.S. and Russia, and indeed all countries around the world, increase their cooperation to block terrorist access to weapons of mass
destruction.

November 7, 2001

George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Vladimir V. Putin
President of the Russian Federation
The Kremlin
Moscow, 103073
Russian Federation

Dear President Bush and President Putin:

In light of the new and emerging challenges posed by international terrorism, we believe that it is now more important than ever that the U.S. and Russia, and indeed all countries around the world, increase their cooperation to block terrorist access to weapons of mass
destruction.

On September 19, 2001 we sent a letter to you and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency stressing the need for greater international efforts to deny terrorists access to nuclear material and weapons, and making some specific recommendations for action. Now we would like to underscore the importance that we attach to this issue in advance of your upcoming summit meeting.

We recommend that a significant political commitment be made by both the United States and Russia to do everything possible to keep weapons of mass destruction and associated materials and technologies out of the hands of hostile states or entities. This will require that political mechanisms be established to break bureaucratic logjams, and that
sufficient funds be committed immediately to eliminate the vulnerabilities that exist in Russia and America.

As part of such an initiative, we suggest that you agree to establish a U.S.-Russian Special Presidential Commission on Weapons of Mass
Destruction Security. This joint commission should prepare, on an expedited basis, recommendations to the Presidents on how to improve and accelerate the implementation of existing cooperative security work and
proposals for new, important activities. Only at this high level of focus will the optimal level of effort be achieved. The commission
could include a joint U.S.-Russian group tasked to develop a strategic plan for securing all weapons and materials, and relevant expertise and technology that is under U.S. and Russian control and disposing of excess weapons and materials as rapidly as practicable. The partnership should then be extended to joint U.S.-Russian efforts to upgrade security for weapons of mass destruction and related materials and
technologies in other countries around the world, as a step toward rebuilding the nonproliferation partnership between Moscow and Washington that existed in previous times. Both countries would have to provide the necessary increased resources to carry out the agreed plan,and senior officials to take charge of implementing it and overcoming
bureaucratic obstacles that have slowed progress in recent years. Such a strategic plan would provide a roadmap for project prioritization, and agreed-upon milestones for implementation. A precedent for such a plan
can be found in the joint technical plans for improving nuclear material security that were developed in the early 1990s by the U.S. and Russian nuclear laboratories. Such a "Bush-Putin Initiative" would be an historic achievement at this summit, and do much to avert potential future threats to world security.

The commission would further the development of closer U.S.-Russian cooperation on anti-terrorism. It could be co-chaired by high-level government officials, or perhaps by former U.S. and Russian officials or
legislators. Its scope should include the prevention of chemical and biological as well as nuclear proliferation.

Unfortunately, over the past five years, many of the major U.S.-Russian cooperative security programs have slowed. Many activities have
received scant infusions of political capital in either Washington or Moscow, and as a result have been under-funded or had their timelines for completion unnecessarily extended many years into the future. Some
are seriously endangered. Bureaucratic disputes, disagreements on levels of access to facilities, and other political differences have eroded the vital U.S.-Russian nonproliferation partnership, hampering
the implementation of many important international security programs. A renewed spirit of joint political support, commitment, and cooperation, reflecting a new and closer U.S.-Russian relationship, could reverse the
slowdown and create a new dynamic for rapid security improvements. It would give meaning to the joint commitment you made in Shanghai in October to "enhance bilateral and multilateral action to stem the export and proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological materials, related technologies, and delivery systems as a critical component of the battle to defeat international terrorism."


Sincerely,

Matthew Bunn
Assistant Director
Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program
Harvard University
Former Advisor to White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

Kenneth N. Luongo
Executive Director
Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC)
Former Director, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, U.S.
Department of Energy

Frank N. von Hippel
Professor of Public and International Affairs
Princeton University
Former Assistant Director for National Security, White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy