A Marginalized Region

BEIRUT -- A year-end look at trends in the Arab world during the past 12 months reveals little to be optimistic about. The core weaknesses, distortions and dysfunctionalities of the Arab world all seemed to worsen during the past year. Here are the major trends that I believe define our region these days, and will persist for some years to come.

I. A strange combination of self-assertion and reliance on foreign actors is the major characteristic of the Arab world, reflecting the massive polarization of our societies into two opposing camps.

On the one hand, many in our region continue to look abroad for protection or salvation, in the form of countries, ethnic groups or political movements that rely on foreign patronage for their survival more than they do on their own people. 

We remain deeply mired in a colonial-era mentality in many respects. The massive attention paid to awaiting the new Middle East policies of the Obama administration in the United States is the most dramatic manifestation of this trend.

On the other hand, the single most important change in the Arab World in the past two decades has been the attempt by several hundred million people to break away from this "vassals-of-the-West" mentality, and instead to assert one's own identity and interests. The various Islamist movements in the region have been the main vehicles for such self-assertion, but these movements have not been able to translate their proven credibility into coherent state-building momentum. 

Islamists remain primarily defensive and reactionary movements -- very effective at confronting Western powers, Israel, and some domestic forces, but lacking any proven capacity to address mass needs in sectors such as job creation, environmental protection and political modernization.

II. Formerly integrated and cohesive societies throughout the Middle East continue to fracture into four main components: state-run bureaucracies with a heavy security element; the private sector with a heavy globalized consumerist dimension; assertive traditional identities (mainly Islamism and tribalism); and, assorted criminalized groups, including youth gangs, militias, illegal migrants, drugs networks, and structured theft networks that live off government resources. These four different sectors of society coexist relatively comfortably with one another, each occupying its own space in society and relying on its own resources.

The big loser in this trend has been the cohesion and integrity of the modern Arab state, which has broadly failed to develop a viable sense of citizenship among its nationals. 

III. Political liberalization and democratization are dormant for the time being. These remain buried beneath the stultifying weight of corruption-riddled Arab security states, emotion- and fear-driven mass movements, and the debilitating impact of Israeli, American, and other foreign interventions. 

Like nationalism, genuine politics and peaceful electoral contestation of power in the Arab world are victims of our own excesses. As economic stress throughout the Middle East increases in the wake of the current global downturn, prospects for political democratization will further recede on the regional priority list.

IV. As a consequence of the above three trends, major political issues of importance to the people of this region are increasingly inconsequential to most people and powers around the world. The electoral politics of the Metn region in Lebanon, the tribal politics of Gaza, the human rights conditions in Syria and Morocco, and the forty years of Moammar Gaddafi's rule in Libya are issues that no longer occupy any serious time or thought among leaders in the world's most powerful countries, regardless of whether we accept that or not.

The worst ramifications of the Middle East's dysfunctions -- terrorism, illegal migration, ethnic strife, corruption, police states, and assorted atrocities perpetuated by both state and private actors -- are only occasional irritants for the rest of the world, not pressing strategic threats. We have marginalized ourselves as serious players on the global political stage, and now assume the role of nagging annoyances and miscreants.

V. The oldest and most powerful driver of discontent, disequilibrium, and radicalism in our region -- the Arab-Israeli conflict -- remains totally stalemated, more an object of insincere and unconvincing "peace process" rhetoric than any genuine sense of diplomatic urgency. It is also now more difficult to resolve than ever, given complicating new factors. 

These include mass skepticism from many recent failed peace-making attempts, Iran's growing regional role, the rise of powerful and increasingly independent Islamist groups like Hizbullah and Hamas, a structurally pro-Israeli American position, a steady shift towards the racist right within Israel, and genetic Arab incompetence in pushing the 2002 Arab peace plan as a serious prod to a comprehensive settlement.

This is a depressing list of broad trends in the Arab World -- but also a volatile one that the people and states of the region cannot withstand for many more years. The good news is that these trends are all the consequences of man-made decisions and policies that can all be corrected by more constructive and equitable policies in the future.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.