Talking Through a Nuclear Staredown

President John F. Kennedy's performance in talking to the leader of the "Evil Empire" before, during, and after the most dangerous moment in human history offers valuable lessons for dealing with members of the "axis of evil" today.

Communication between the American and Soviet governments during the Kennedy administration included not only first-class ambassadors and formal communiqués. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev also exchanged scores of secret letters. This private channel proved crucial in negotiating a peaceful end to the Cuban missile crisis.

In a secret Oct. 26, 1962, letter, Khrushchev signaled a willingness to dismantle the missiles in Cuba if the United States was willing to pledge not to invade Cuba. Khrushchev wrote, "You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear."

But before Kennedy had responded to Khrushchev's letter, a second formal message from the Soviet Politburo arrived. That message added a new condition for withdrawal: that the United States remove its nuclear missiles from Turkey.

Kennedy was not prepared to publicly accept these terms. Such a trade could appear to be selling out the security of a NATO ally. American credibility would be undermined and its alliances jeopardized. On the other hand, Kennedy judged US missiles in Turkey essentially irrelevant for American or alliance security. He thus devised the idea of a secret response to Khrushchev.

The president's brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, delivered the terms of a proposed deal to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington. According to the complex compromise: the United States would publicly pledge not to invade Cuba; the Soviets would remove the missiles from Cuba; and six months thereafter, US missiles in Turkey would be withdrawn. But Robert Kennedy warned that Khrushchev had 24 hours to accept the offer before the United States would go ahead with other more forceful options.

Khrushchev accepted these terms and announced the next morning that Soviet missiles would be removed.

Why was Kennedy willing to deal with an enemy that had killed millions of its citizens and threatened to kill tens of millions of Americans? Because he believed in the principle announced in his inaugural address: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

Most other presidents, Republican and Democrat alike, have agreed with this principle. Ronald Reagan eagerly engaged Soviet leaders face-to-face, confiding in his diary that, "Continued negotiation with the Soviet Union is essential. We need never to be afraid to negotiate."

The fact that leaders are talking offers no guarantee that either is speaking truthfully or that they understand each other. Prior to the missile crisis, Dobrynin had falsely assured Robert Kennedy that the Soviet Union was not placing nuclear missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy wrongly believed that he had made clear that he would never tolerate Soviet missiles 90 miles off America's shores.

During its first term, the Bush administration refused to talk to adversaries it judged evil. In the second term, Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have reverted to mainstream diplomacy in dealing with North Korea. Deft orchestration of six-party talks and bilateral negotiations, plus a new willingness to give as well as to get, has succeeded in reaching agreement to disable North Korean nuclear facilities in return for fuel oil and economic assistance.

In contrast, for 6 1/2 years, the United States has refused to negotiate with Iran. During that time, Iran has proceeded toward its nuclear goal line. Sixteen months ago, the Bush administration changed course, offering to sit down for negotiations - if Iran first suspends all nuclear enrichment activity. Otherwise, Iran could continue enriching as negotiations drag on.

However valid the merits of this position, the brute fact is that Iran is now 16 months further down the road to fulfilling its nuclear ambitions. If Iran is to be stopped without war, Bush will have to summon as much imagination in finding ways to engage Iran now as Kennedy did in resolving the Cuban missile crisis.

Graham Allison is director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and author of "Essence of Decision" and "Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe."