Research

In the wake of Iran’s unprecedented retaliation against Israel, following the latter’s attack against Iran’s embassy compound in Damascus, Syria, a major effort is being made to contain the conflict from expanding into a wider war. The Biden administration has stated that it is not seeking escalation, and that its actions are defensive, but that then there must be a return to “the issue at hand.” Specifically, that means securing and ending the Gaza conflict, obtaining a ceasefire, the release of the hostages, and providing humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians in Gaza. In other words, focus on resolving the Israeli Palestinian conflict that sparked the Iranian-Israeli confrontation.

The paper argues for putting aside the old rentier state paradigm that has long dominated Gulf literature, considering the emergence of both the Gulf Moment and the United Arab Emirates Momentum (henceforth UAE Momentum). Instead, it offers a novel analytical concept of the Khaleeji state, incorporating both the exceptionalist and normalist approaches to Gulf studies. The Khaleeji state is also a way to comprehend the unfolding of the Gulf Moment. The term Gulf Moment indicates the profound influence that the Arab Gulf States (AGS) maintain over the rest of the Arab world at the turn of the twenty-first century. The UAE momentum is currently the main engine of the Gulf Moment.

6 months on: What is the impact of the war in Gaza?
Brookings experts reflect on the conflict

For the moment, Israel’s priorities are to secure the release of the remaining hostages, eliminate Hamas’s military capabilities, and ensure the safe return of hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens to their communities in both the north and south of the country. But Israel must also take more far-reaching steps to avoid another October 7. To that aim, the state must ramp up defense spending and reinforce its borders. Diplomacy with the Palestinians must be part of the picture, but any mutual arrangement for governing Palestinian areas will have to include strong provisions to prevent the emergence of a remilitarized Palestinian territory. Any progress on longer-term objectives, such as a two-state solution—which is currently perceived as unfeasible and even detached from reality by most Israelis—will require both the support of the United States and normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Ed Djerejian says Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin once told him, “There is no military solution to this conflict, only a political one.” Rabin was assassinated a few years later, and today bullets are flying, bombs are falling, and 1,200 Israelis are dead after the Hamas terrorist attacks of October 7 and nearly 30,000 Gazans have been killed in the Israeli response. Yet Djerejain still believes that a breakthrough is possible even in the current moment, as horrible as it is. Djerejian, a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Relations, says the crisis has shaken the regional status quo to the point where—if the United States pursues diplomacy that includes principled pragmatism, coalition-building, and good old-fashioned backbone—a breakthrough may finally be possible. But in a recent paper he argues that any breakthrough will have to be built around a two-state solution, which he says is the only path to peace and stability not only in Israel and Palestine, but the wider Middle East. Djerejian’s career as a diplomat spanned eight U.S. presidential administrations beginning with John F. Kennedy’s, and he also served as U.S. Ambassador to Syria and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.  

“If only we had a partner for peace.”

That’s been the refrain in the Israel-Palestinian conflict for as long as I’ve followed it. But the truth is you don’t need just a partner; you need two partners able to deliver at the same time.

Please listen here for an interview with MEI Senior Fellow, Dr. Salam Fayyad, on 'The Ezra Klein Show' podcast with the New York Times.

Over the past few months, much has been said about the relationship between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, some of it strikingly shallow and misinformed, with recent op-eds characterising it as a “rivalry” or a “rift”, and one going as far as calling it a “theatre of confrontation” as though their relations are a zero-sum game. Such alarmism led me to wonder if we were even discussing the same two countries.

After six years of U.S. “maximum pressure,” Iran’s economy continues to defy dire predictions of economic collapse that motivated Trump’s hasty 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (also known as the JCPOA). The Biden administration’s continuation of the same policy since 2021 is similarly based on the logic that the weaker Iran’s economy is, the more likely Tehran will bend to Washington’s will. The economy’s resilience is evidenced by the fact that in the first nine months of the Iranian fiscal year (March 21 to December 20, 2023), GDP grew by a 6.7% annual rate, and it is very likely to finish the year in two months with a growth rate exceeding the World Bank and IMF forecasts of about 4%.

Mohammad Tabaar argues that the attacks on Red Sea ships unintentionally advance the Houthis agenda by allowing it to claim that it is fighting imperialism, and the attacks help Iran by fortifying its political foothold in the Middle East. Washington should therefore cease the strikes. It should, instead, work to halt the war in Gaza. The United States should also try to strengthen the region's diplomatic agreements and shore up its security framework. Otherwise, the Houthi-Iranian partnership will only grow stronger, as will Tehran's leverage in the region.

As of early January 2024, discussion of the Gaza war heavily focuses on its humanitarian costs, cease fire possibilities, hostage prospects, and “day after” options. Yet what longer-term strategy guides actions on these vital issues while offering a more positive vision for Israelis, Palestinians, and key regional players? This paper sketches such a vision and strategy, but far more importantly, highlights the formidable barriers to its realization—and the elements of a realistic path to overcoming those barriers. With old political assumptions jolted by recent events, an opening exists for a new and better regional reality to take shape.