174 Items

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105), front, and the Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10), rear, conduct joint operations with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Akebono (DD-108) in the South China Sea

U.S. Navy photo by Aviation Electronics Technician 2nd Class Lucas Herzog

Report - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Navigating China’s Opportunistic Approach to Overseas Naval Base Acquisition

| November 2023

This report, by Maxwell Simon (MPP '23) and Jayaram Ravi (MPP '23), explores the drivers of setback and success that China has encountered in the process of developing dual-use and military-dedicated naval installations abroad. It looks at cases where China has considered or actively pursued military-dedicated installations to characterize Beijing’s general approach to overseas naval base acquisition.

Pakistan Navy soldier stands guard while a loaded Chinese ship prepares to depart.

AP Photo/Muhammad Yousuf

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Pier Competitor: China's Power Position in Global Ports

    Authors:
  • Isaac B. Kardon
  • Wendy Leutert
| Spring 2022

Commercial international port terminals owned and operated by Chinese firms provide dual-use capabilities to the People's Liberation Army during peacetime. They enable China to project power into critical regions worldwide by providing military logistics and intelligence networks.

Book - University of Michigan Press

Capital Choices: Sectoral Politics and the Variation of Sovereign Wealth

| Mar. 07, 2022

Capital Choices analyzes the creation of different SWFs from a comparative political economy perspective, arguing that different state-society structures at the sectoral level are the drivers for SWF variation. Juergen Braunstein focuses on the early formation period of SWFs, a critical but little understood area given the high levels of political sensitivity and lack of transparency that surround SWF creation. Braunstein’s novel analytical framework provides practical lessons for the business and finance organizations and policymakers of countries that have created, or are planning to create, SWFs.

Ambassador Ivor Richard, left, of the United Kingdom, and U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young, right, raise their arms during vote, Friday, Nov. 4, 1977 at the United Nations Security Council.

(AP Photo/Dave Pickoff)

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Caught Red-Handed: How States Wield Proof to Coerce Wrongdoers

| Fall 2021

States frequently acquire proof that other states have violated norms. Yet, existing theories do not fully explain how states wield such proof to coerce wrongdoers. Four case studies of nuclear proliferation probe a novel theory of how states coerce norm violators by concealing, sharing privately, or publicizing proof of guilt.

Photo of a visitor to a Huawei retail store stands near a Huawei smartphone displaying a variety of apps in Beijing on Tuesday, Sept. 8, 2020.

AP Photo/Ng Han Guan

U.S.-China Bipolar Rivalry in the Digital Age

Fall 2020

From trade disputes to digital governance to multilateral institutions in need of reform, the incoming Biden Administration faces a full international economics policy agenda. Rising U.S.-China tensions will exacerbate these policy challenges as the world’s two largest economies compete for economic power and global influence. This fall, the Belfer Center’s Economic Diplomacy Initiative, led by Aditi KumarNicholas Burns, and Lawrence H. Summers, hosted a series of discussions examining the U.S.-China economic relationship.  

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Magazine Article - Economist

Digital Dominance: A new global ranking of cyber-power throws up some surprises

China has the world’s largest army. Russia wields the most tanks. America owns the fanciest satellites. But who has the most cyber-power? A new National Cyber Power Index by the Belfer Centre at Harvard University ranks 30 countries on their level of ambition and capability. Offensive cyber-power—the ability to do harm in or through computer networks—is one measure. But so too are the strength of a country’s defences, the sophistication of its cyber-security industry and its ability to spread and counter propaganda.