Research

Early in Richard Rhodes’s new book, “Energy: A Human History,” we hear of a prominent citizen using colorful language to lament the state of his polluted city and urge his government to shut down industry or move it elsewhere: “If there be a resemblance of hell upon earth, it is in this volcano [on] a foggy day.” Though this could easily apply to modern-day Beijing, the speaker here is John Evelyn, a wealthy horticulturalist and one of the founders of the scientific Royal Society of London — and he’s complaining about London in 1659.

The world has crossed over to a new nuclear era, where a fateful error -- rather than intentional aggression -- is the most likely catalyst to nuclear catastrophe.

In the cyber arena, the same technologies that are creating unprecedented benefits for billions are also democratizing destruction. Graham Allison reviews ‘The Virtual Weapon and International Order’ by Lucas Kello.

Former Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall is joining Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs as a Senior Fellow, the Center announced today. Sherwood-Randall, who has served in the White House and Departments of Energy and Defense, is returning to the Center where she worked in the 1990s to help establish two pioneering projects – the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project with Graham Allison, who this month stepped down as the Center’s director, and the Preventive Defense Project with Ash Carter, the former Secretary of Defense who is the new Belfer Center director.

When Ben Buchanan received his first computer 17 years ago, he could not have known that the technical skills he acquired would prove vital to understanding today's cybersecurity dilemma.

Regardless of the innovations that lie ahead, technology by itself will neither doom nor rescue the world. Responsibility for our fate, for better or worse, will remain stubbornly human.

This policy brief is based on “What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Concepts, Causes, and Assessment,” which appears in the winter 2016/17 issue of International Security.

Does cyberspace favor the offense, as many analysts and policymakers claim? Three factors undermine any cyber offensive advantage, as demonstrated in a cost-benefit analysis of the Stuxnet operation against Iran. First, any measurement of the offense-defense balance must consider a cyber operation’s value as well as its cost to both sides. Second, organizational capabilities play a significant role in determining the balance. Third, offensive advantages decline when attackers target physical infrastructure rather than information networks.

As Donald Trump's inauguration approaches, people around the world are struggling to understand the inhabitants of the newest Trump Tower, the one at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington DC. With freewheeling leadership, uncertainty about the enduring guidance of presidential statements and less ideological coherence than in previous cabinets, the processes by which decisions are reached will be vital.