Articles

Of all the intractable issues that could spark a hot war between the United States and China, Taiwan is at the very top of the list. And the potential geopolitical consequences of such a war would be profound. Taiwan-"an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender," as U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur once described it--has important, often underappreciated military value as a gateway to the Philippine Sea, a vital theater for defending Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea from possible Chinese coercion or attack.

Commercial international port terminals owned and operated by Chinese firms provide dual-use capabilities to the People's Liberation Army during peacetime. They enable China to project power into critical regions worldwide by providing military logistics and intelligence networks.

David Kilcullen, a professor at the University of New South Wales, contributes to the debate of  whether contemporary great-power resurgence constitutes a second bi-polar competition by assessing resurging state and non-state competitors and the challenges they pose to the United States–led world order. While the emerging security environment might not be a new Cold War, Kilcullen contends it may be more dangerous than in the past.

A new typology of “assertive” state behaviors, and original time-series events data covering the period from 1970 to 2015, shows that China’s key policy in the South China Sea—rapid administrative buildup and introduction of regular coercive behaviors—occurred in 2007, earlier than most analysis has supposed.

Tongfi Kim and Andrew Taffer respond to Ketian Zhang’s summer 2019 article, “Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea.”

China has the world’s largest army. Russia wields the most tanks. America owns the fanciest satellites. But who has the most cyber-power? A new National Cyber Power Index by the Belfer Centre at Harvard University ranks 30 countries on their level of ambition and capability. Offensive cyber-power—the ability to do harm in or through computer networks—is one measure. But so too are the strength of a country’s defences, the sophistication of its cyber-security industry and its ability to spread and counter propaganda.

As conventional wisdom goes, experts tend to rank the U.S ahead of China, U.K., Iran, North Korea, Russia, in terms of how strong it is when it comes to cyberspace. But a new study from Harvard University’s Belfer Center shows that China has closed the gap on the U.S. in three key categories: surveillance, cyber defense, and its efforts to build up its commercial cyber sector.

“A lot of people, Americans in particular, will think that the U.S., the U.K., France, Israel are more advanced than China when it comes to cyber power,” Eric Rosenbach, the Co-Director of Harvard’s Belfer Center, told CyberScoop. “Our study shows it’s just not the case and that China is very sophisticated and almost at a peer level with the U.S.”

While China’s grand strategy under Xi Jinping is clearly distinctive, it does not fundamentally break with the grand strategy that Chinese leaders have embraced since the early 1990s—one that aims to realize China’s “dream of national rejuvenation.”

How “war on terror” rhetoric contributed to the repression of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in China.

The Chinese Communist Party changed its internal security strategy in Xinjiang in early 2017 because of Beijing’s changing perception of Uyghur involvement in transnational Islamic militancy abroad, which heightened perceived domestic vulnerability to terrorism.