Articles

Joel Brenner responds to Jon R. Lindsay's winter 2014/15 International Security article, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction."

Jon R. Lindsay responds to Lucas Kello's fall 2013 International Security article, "The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft."

Cyberwar has been described as a revolution in military affairs capable of overturning the prevailing world order. By itself, however, cyberwar can achieve neither conquest nor, in most cases, coercion. Conflict over the internet is much more likely to serve as an adjunct to, rather than a substitute for, existing modes of terrestrial force, and to augment the advantages of status quo powers rather than threatening existing political hierarchies.

While decisionmakers warn about the cyber threat constantly, there is little systematic analysis of the issue from an international security studies perspective. Cyberweapons are expanding the range of possible harm between the concepts of war and peace, and give rise to enormous defense complications and dangers to strategic stability. It is detrimental to the intellectual progress and policy relevance of the security studies field to continue to avoid the cyber revolution's central questions.

Will the growth of nuclear power lead to increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism? Will the nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely and heavily invested in nuclear power? The authors in this two-volume (Fall 2009 and Winter 2010) special issue of Dædalus have one simple and clear answer to these questions: It depends.

Dr. Ashton B. Carter in Foreign Affairs.

Carter, Deutch, and Zelikow addresses the threat of Catastrophic Terrorism in Foreign Affairs.

Scenario one: If North Korea fired a nuclear-armed missile that devastated an American city, how would the U.S. government respond? The state-sponsored attack would fit within the Cold War paradigm; therefore, the certain American response would be an overwhelming retaliation aimed at destroying Pyongyang, Kim Jong Il's nuclear and missile programs, and North Korea's million-man army. Such a response would result in enormous collateral damage, killing millions of North Koreans. Despite reservations about the morality of such a response, those who established the Cold War nuclear doctrine recognized -- and accepted -- the unintended deaths of millions of innocents. Whoever occupied the White House during such a nuclear attack would understand this also.

Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall on U.S. Alliances in the Joint Forces Quarterly