Articles

Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," was published by in the Summer 2009 issue of International Security. In his article, Dr. Fuhrmann argues "Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs."

"I would urge every scientist and engineer with an interest in the intersection of S&T with sustainable well-being...to 'tithe' 10% of your professional time and effort to working in these and other ways to increase the benefits of S&T for the human condition and to decrease the liabilities. If so much as a substantial fraction of the world's scientists and engineers resolved to do this much, the acceleration of progress toward sustainable well-being for all of Earth's inhabitants would surprise us all."

Pakistan's security environment has deteriorated through its adoption of a declared nuclear weapons posture in May 1998. Internal fissures have widened along regional and sectarian lines as the Pakistani economy falters, unable to sustain even limited external sanctions following decades of internal mismanagement. Tensions with India have also increased as Pakistan's security managers adopt interventionist policies, based on a misplaced belief in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. The international community, in particular, the USA's failure to reverse South Asian nuclear proliferation, has emboldened Indian advocates of nuclear deployment. If India deploys nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, Pakistan will follow suit. Operation-ready nuclear weapons will increase the prospects of an India - Pakistan conflict that could assume a nuclear dimension. Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability will not prevent an Indian conventional attack nor will the presence of nuclear weapons deter an Indian accidental, unauthorised or preventive nuclear attack. Changed domestic and external priorities alone can buttress Pakistani security.

The operation of dedicated plutonium-production reactors and large gaseous-diffusion uranium-enrichment plants (GDPs), can be detected remotely using commercial observation-satellite imagery. Declassified Corona imagery is used to demonstrate that the new generation of commercial observation satellites with 1-meter spatial resolution will be able to detect vapor plumes inside and downwind from large operating natural-draft cooling towers. Low-resolution Landsat-5 thermal infrared images have been shown by other authors to be able to detect warm water discharges from reactors into lakes, rivers, etc. Here, the same systems are shown to be able detect the elevated temperature of the roofs of large operating GDPs. Commercial-satellite observations could therefore play an important role in increasing confidence in declarations that plutonium-production reactors and GDPs have been shut down as a result of a fissile material-production moratorium or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

One key building block in a comprehensive strategy to contain and eliminate nuclear weapons is the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which would ban the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. However, negotiations on this treaty have been at an impasse in Geneva since 1993. Since realistically a FMCT will probably not come into force for some years, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons should be encouraged in order to capture as many of the benefits of an FMCT in the interim.

Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) may soon be launched at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva after several years' delay caused by debates over its scope and linkage to nuclear disarmament measures. Fissile material, in practice plutonium or HEU, is the fundamental ingredient in all nuclear weapons. It is also the most difficult and expensive part to produce. A global, verified ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives would be a key building block in a comprehensive strategy to contain and eliminate nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons have the capability to destroy all the creatures of this Earth. As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a danger of accidental or deliberate use with disastrous consequences. Therefore, the negotiation of a NWC is vital to all humanity. However, such negotiations have not started yet because of the opposition of the nuclear weapon states (except China). The NWC negotiations will not make progress without these states’ participation. The main reason for these nuclear states’ objections to NWC negotiations is that they continue to rely on the deterrence role of nuclear weapons, despite there being no rationale for deterrence since the end of the Cold War. To reach the goal of the NWC, therefore, the major steps are to reduce the deterrence role of nuclear weapons and to render such weapons unusable.

Both Russia and the United States are faced with decisions on how to dispose of plutonium and highly enriched uranium recovered from dismantled warheads, and from various nuclear weapons facilities. In the U.S., the Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that 50 or more metric tonnes (MT) of weapons plutonium and hundreds of metric tonnes of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) will be considered "excess." Disposition of these materials is essential for national and international security reasons.

Effective approaches to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)--the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons— are fundamental to controlling nuclear proliferation and providing the basis for deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles.