Articles

29 Items

Ugandan Asians have their papers examined by ship's officer of the SS Haryana before they boarded the ship

AP Photo

Newspaper Article - Harvard Crimson

Kennedy School Postdoc Discusses Government-Sanctioned Mass Expulsion at Belfer Center Seminar

    Authors:
  • Cam E. Kettles
  • Jasmine Palma
  • Rysa Tahilramani
| Nov. 04, 2022

Meghan M. Garrity, an International Security Program postdoctoral fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center discussed her research on government-sanctioned mass expulsion events at a virtual seminar on November 3, 2022.

Laurent Kabila, President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, with Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, center, shakes hands with Rwandan Military Chief of Staff Sam Kaka in Kigali, Monday, September 8, 1997.

AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

You Can't Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations

| Fall 2016

In recent decades, the United States has attempted to overthrow the regimes of several other countries in the hopes that the new regimes will be friendly toward Washington. Does foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) succeed in making target states more accommodating to interveners’ interests? A new dataset and an analysis of foreign interventions in the Congo Wars show that FIRC damages relations between intervener and target state more often than it improves them.

Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe presents medals to soldiers who have fought in the Congo, Tuesday, August 13, 2002.

AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Origins of Transnational Alliances: Rulers, Rebels, and Political Survival in the Congo Wars

    Author:
  • Henning Tamm
| Summer 2016

Alliances between local combatants and neighboring rulers played a crucial role in the Congo Wars. Yet the transnational dimensions of the conflicts remain understudied. Case studies reveal that the rulers of Angola, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe intervened in Congo to secure their own political survival. They forged alliances to thwart domestic rebels supported by foreign rulers or to gain access to resources that could ensure the loyalty of domestic elites.

Members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front celebrate at Camp Darapanan in Sultan Kudarat, Philippines on Thursday March 27, 2014 as they await the signing of a peace accord between the government and their group in Manila.

AP/ Froilan Gallardo

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War

| Winter 2015/16

Many international peacebuilders have suggested that integrating opposing combatants into a national military after civil war helps prevent conflict from recurring. Analysis of eleven cases of post–civil war military integration, however, reveals little evidence to support this claim. Underlying political conditions, not military integration, determine whether peace endures.

In this Thursday, Feb. 17, 2011 file photo, hundreds of newly trained al-Shabaab fighters perform military exercises in the Lafofe area 18 km south of Mogadishu, Somalia.

Farah Abdi Warsameh/ AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Security Bazaar: Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia

| Winter 2014/15

The support of the local business community helped to make Islamists’ a powerful force in the Somali civil war. The Islamists gained business support not because of shared religious affiliation, but because they ran a more stable and less costly protection racket than did other belligerents.

Darfur rebels are seen in their northern desert stronghold of Bir Maza in Sudan, Sunday, Dec. 9, 2007.

Alfred De Montesquiou/ AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Why Factions Switch Sides in Civil Wars: Rivalry, Patronage, and Realignment in Sudan

| Fall 2014

Why do armed groups switch sides in civil wars? In weak states with few obstacles to switching sides, groups defect for material gain or to acquire military support in local struggles. Such shifts have implications for how long civil wars will endure, how they will end, and the prospects for state building.

Ethnofederalism: The Worst Form of Institutional Arrangement…?

Getty Images

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Ethnofederalism: The Worst Form of Institutional Arrangement…?

    Author:
  • Liam Anderson
| Summer 2014

Critics of ethnofederalism—a political system in which federal subunits reflect ethnic groups’ territorial distribution—argue that it facilitates secession and state collapse. An examination of post-1945 ethnofederal states, however, shows that ethnofederalism has succeeded more often than not.

The women in this image are Minova, DRC, rape survivors who are veiled so they cannot be seen or recognized in court during their testimony.

Globalpost image

Journal Article - Journal of Peace Research

Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Introducing the SVAC Dataset, 1989–2009

| May 2014

Which armed groups have perpetrated sexual violence in recent conflicts? This article presents patterns from the new Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset. The dataset, coded from the three most widely used sources in the quantitative human rights literature, covers 129 active conflicts, and the 625 armed actors involved in these conflicts, during the period 1989–2009.

A Palestinian youth throws stones at Israeli troops, not seen, as a boy holding a Palestinian flag stands behind, Wednesday, Nov. 14, 2012.

Nasser Shiyoukhi/ AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Structure of Success: How the Internal Distribution of Power Drives Armed Group Behavior and National Movement Effectiveness

| Winter 2013/14

When and why do national movements succeed? What explains variation in the use and effectiveness of political violence employed by nationalist groups? Analysis of seventeen campaigns involving sixteen groups within the Palestinian and Algerian national movements suggests that hegemonic movements with one significant group are most likely to succeed.