Articles

13 Items

Sub-Saharan migrants climb over a metallic fence that divides Morocco and the Spanish enclave of Melilla on Friday, March 28, 2014.

Santi Palacios/ AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why

    Authors:
  • Ron E. Hassner
  • Jason Wittenberg
| Summer 2015

Contrary to conventional wisdom, states do not typically construct fortified boundaries in response to border disputes or to prevent terrorism. Instead, most build such boundaries for economic reasons, to keep out unwanted migrants from poorer states. Further, Muslim states are more likely to both build and be the targets of fortified boundaries.

In this Thursday, Feb. 17, 2011 file photo, hundreds of newly trained al-Shabaab fighters perform military exercises in the Lafofe area 18 km south of Mogadishu, Somalia.

Farah Abdi Warsameh/ AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Security Bazaar: Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia

| Winter 2014/15

The support of the local business community helped to make Islamists’ a powerful force in the Somali civil war. The Islamists gained business support not because of shared religious affiliation, but because they ran a more stable and less costly protection racket than did other belligerents.

Darfur rebels are seen in their northern desert stronghold of Bir Maza in Sudan, Sunday, Dec. 9, 2007.

Alfred De Montesquiou/ AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Why Factions Switch Sides in Civil Wars: Rivalry, Patronage, and Realignment in Sudan

| Fall 2014

Why do armed groups switch sides in civil wars? In weak states with few obstacles to switching sides, groups defect for material gain or to acquire military support in local struggles. Such shifts have implications for how long civil wars will endure, how they will end, and the prospects for state building.

This frame grab taken from an August 5, 2007 video message carrying the logo of al-Qaida's production house as-Sahab and provided by IntelCenter, a U.S. government contractor monitoring al-Qaida messaging, purports to show Ayman Zawahri.

AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Delegitimizing al-Qaida: Defeating an 'Army Whose Men Love Death'

    Authors:
  • Jerry Mark Long
  • Alex S. Wilner
| Summer 2014

Al-Qaida has established a metanarrative that enables it to recruit militants and supporters. The United States and its allies can challenge its ability to do so by delegitimizing the ideological motivations that inform that metanarrative.

An unmanned U.S. Predator drone flies over Kandahar Air Field, southern Afghanistan.

Kirsty Wigglesworth / AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes

    Author:
  • Jenna Jordan
| Spring 2014

Many academics and policymakers argue that the removal of leaders is an effective strategy in combating terrorism. Leadership decapitation is not always successful, however. A theory of organizational resilience explains why some terrorist organizations survive decapitation. Application of this theoretical model to the case of al-Qaida reveals that the deaths of Osama bin Laden and other high level al-Qaida operatives are unlikely to cause significant organizational decline.

Gertrude Kitongo poses with her mobile phone in Johannesburg, South Africa. She cherishes a cell phone as a link to family and friends and also sees it as a radio, a library, a mini cinema, a bank teller, etc., Nov. 8, 2011.

AP Photo

Magazine Article - Finance & Development

Africa's New Engine

| December 2011

Cell phone use has grown faster in Africa than in any other region of the world since 2003....Of course, South Africa—the most developed nation—still has the highest penetration, but across Africa, countries have leapfrogged technology, bringing innovation and connectivity even to remote parts of the continent, opening up mobile banking and changing the way business is done.

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics: A Neorealist Synthesis

    Author:
  • Davide Fiammenghi
| Spring 2011

Realist scholars have long debated the question of how much power states need to feel secure. Offensive realists claim that states should constantly seek to increase their power. Defensive realists argue that accumulating too much power can be self-defeating. Proponents of hegemonic stability theory contend that the accumulation of capabilities in one state can exert a stabilizing effect on the system. The three schools describe different points along the power con­tinuum. When a state is weak, accumulating power increases its security. This is approximately the situation described by offensive realists. A state that con­tinues to accumulate capabilities will eventually triggers a balancing reaction that puts its security at risk. This scenario accords with defensive realist as­sumptions. Finally, when the state becomes too powerful to balance, its oppo­nents bandwagon with it, and the state’s security begins to increase again. This is the situation described by hegemonic stability theory. These three stages delineate a modified parabolic relationship between power and secu­rity. As a state moves along the power continuum, its security increases up to a point, then decreases, and finally increases again. This modified parabolic re­lationship allows scholars to synthesize previous realist theories into a single framework.

Dec. 8, 2008: Somalia's al-Shabab jihadis outside Mogadishu. Training camps there are attracting hundreds of foreigners, including Americans which pose a threat far from Somalia, including to the U.S. homeland.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Current Trends in Islamist Ideology

The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups

| November 18, 2009

In the past five years, "far enemy groups" such as al-Qaeda Central have adopted a more hostile and explicitly takfiri rhetoric toward Muslim regimes. Conversely, "near enemy" activists such as the militants in Algeria have become more anti-Western in both words and deeds. A process of ideological hybridization has occurred, with the result that the enemy hierarchies of many jihadist groups are becoming more unclear or heterogeneous than they used to be.

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Journal Article - Journal of Conflict Resolution

What Leads Some Ordinary Men and Women in Arab Countries to Support Terrorism Against the United States?: Evidence from Survey Research in Algeria and Jordan

| April 2007

Findings from representative national surveys in Algeria and Jordan show that nei- ther religious orientations, judgments about Western culture, nor economic circum- stances account for variance in approval of terrorist acts against U.S. targets. Alternatively, in both countries, approval of terrorism against the United States is dis- proportionately likely among men and women with negative judgments about their own government and about U.S. foreign policy. Taken together, these findings sug- gest that approval of terrorism is fostered by negative attitudes toward actors consid- ered responsible for the political and economic status quo. Given that Algeria and Jordan have had different experiences with respect to terrorism and also differ in demographic, political, and economic structure, identical findings from these dis- similar countries suggest that the observed relationships are not country specific and may apply more generally.