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Military watching the start of work on the first part of some 180 kilometers of a 5.5 meter-high metal wall

AP/Czarek Sokolowski

Magazine Article - Foreign Affairs

When Migrants Become Weapons: The Long History and Worrying Future of a Coercive Tactic

| March/April 2022

Kelly Greenhill argues that by exploiting political divisions that exist within targeted states, the threatened or actual deployment of engineered flows of migrants has long been a distressingly effective policy instrument, and it is unlikely to go away anytime soon. Unless policymakers begin to confront the forces that enable weaponized migration, the favored policy responses seem destined to increase, rather than curtail, its use.

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics: A Neorealist Synthesis

    Author:
  • Davide Fiammenghi
| Spring 2011

Realist scholars have long debated the question of how much power states need to feel secure. Offensive realists claim that states should constantly seek to increase their power. Defensive realists argue that accumulating too much power can be self-defeating. Proponents of hegemonic stability theory contend that the accumulation of capabilities in one state can exert a stabilizing effect on the system. The three schools describe different points along the power con­tinuum. When a state is weak, accumulating power increases its security. This is approximately the situation described by offensive realists. A state that con­tinues to accumulate capabilities will eventually triggers a balancing reaction that puts its security at risk. This scenario accords with defensive realist as­sumptions. Finally, when the state becomes too powerful to balance, its oppo­nents bandwagon with it, and the state’s security begins to increase again. This is the situation described by hegemonic stability theory. These three stages delineate a modified parabolic relationship between power and secu­rity. As a state moves along the power continuum, its security increases up to a point, then decreases, and finally increases again. This modified parabolic re­lationship allows scholars to synthesize previous realist theories into a single framework.

Gene A. Cretz, the first U.S. ambassador to Libya in 36 years, at a ceremony opening the visa services section at the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, Libya, Apr. 2, 2009.

AP Photo

Journal Article - PS: Political Science and Politics

Diplomatic Sanctions as a U.S. Foreign Policy Tool: Helpful or Harmful?

| October 2010

"...[D]iplomatic sanctions are seen as a low-cost means of isolating and delegitimizing regimes. This perspective, however, fails to recognize that maintaining diplomatic sanctions may actually entail a number of substantial costs to the United States and may even undermine economic sanctions' effectiveness."

Foreign Muslim students visit the Shifa medicine factory, Sep.18, 2001, in Khartoum, Sudan. U.S. President Bill Clinton closed the U.S. Embassy in Sudan and imposed trade sanctions in 1997 and ordered a missile attack against the Shifa factory in 1998.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Washington Quarterly

Diplomacy Derailed: The Consequences of Diplomatic Sanctions

| July 2010

"Diplomatic sanctions...entail a number of often overlooked consequences for the United States. The potential costs of diplomatic sanctions include not only a substantial loss of information and intelligence on the target state, but also a reduction in communication capacity and a diminished ability to influence the target state. Ironically, diplomatic sanctions may even undermine the effectiveness of other coercive policy tools, such as economic sanctions. These adverse effects ought to cause policymakers to reassess the value of diplomatic isolation as a tool of foreign policy and recognize the inherent value of diplomatic engagement."