Articles

2 Items

Gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment recovered en route to Libya in 2003.

U.S. Department of Energy

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes: The Gas Centrifuge, Supply-Side Controls, and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation

| Spring 2014

Policymakers have long focused on preventing nuclear weapons proliferation by controlling technology. Even developing countries, however, may now possess the technical ability to create nuclear weapons. The history of gas centrifuge development in twenty countries supports this perspective. To reduce the demand for nuclear weapons, policymakers will have look toward the cultural, normative, and political organization of the world.

Foreign Muslim students visit the Shifa medicine factory, Sep.18, 2001, in Khartoum, Sudan. U.S. President Bill Clinton closed the U.S. Embassy in Sudan and imposed trade sanctions in 1997 and ordered a missile attack against the Shifa factory in 1998.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Washington Quarterly

Diplomacy Derailed: The Consequences of Diplomatic Sanctions

| July 2010

"Diplomatic sanctions...entail a number of often overlooked consequences for the United States. The potential costs of diplomatic sanctions include not only a substantial loss of information and intelligence on the target state, but also a reduction in communication capacity and a diminished ability to influence the target state. Ironically, diplomatic sanctions may even undermine the effectiveness of other coercive policy tools, such as economic sanctions. These adverse effects ought to cause policymakers to reassess the value of diplomatic isolation as a tool of foreign policy and recognize the inherent value of diplomatic engagement."