Articles

43 Items

People practice combat skills in urban areas during a training course for national resistance of the Municipal Guard near Kyiv, Ukraine, on Jan. 19, 2024.

AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka

Journal Article - International Security

A “Nuclear Umbrella” for Ukraine? Precedents and Possibilities for Postwar European Security

| Winter 2023/24

Europe after the Russo-Ukrainian War must develop a new security structure to defend against any Russian aggression. The safest option is a non-offensive, confidence-building defense. This option includes proposals such as the “spider in the web” strategy and the “porcupine” strategy to provide for European security in a region threatened by Russian expansion—without relying on the threat of nuclear war. 

People stuck flowers in remains of the Berlin Wall during a commemoration ceremony to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall at the Wall memorial site at Bernauer Strasse in Berlin, Saturday, Nov. 9, 2019.

AP Photo/Markus Schreiber

Journal Article - International Security

We All Fall Down: The Dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the End of the Cold War in Eastern Europe

    Author:
  • Simon Miles
| Winter 2023/24

The non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact contributed to the end of the Cold War along with the superpowers. These Eastern European states recognized that their relationship with the Soviet Union would impede their success in the post–Cold War world, so they ended the Pact.

Oleg tests a drone on the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine.

AP Photo/Natacha Pisarenko

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare

    Authors:
  • Antonio Calcara
  • Mauro Gilli
  • Raffaele Marchetti
  • Ivan Zaccagnini
| Spring 2022

Rather than revolutionizing war, drones demonstrate its evolution. The principle of air warfare remains avoiding exposure to the enemy. Drones are unlikely to shift the offense-defense balance toward the offense because they are vulnerable to attacks from the ground and air.

U.S. troops, part of a NATO mission to enhance Poland's defence, are getting ready for an official welcoming ceremony in Orzysz, northeastern Poland, Thursday, April 13, 2017.

AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back

| Spring 2021

If the United States were to withdraw from Europe, any European effort to develop an autonomous defense capacity would be fundamentally hampered by profoundly diverging threat perceptions and severe military capacity shortfalls that would be very costly and time-consuming to close.

Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, French foreign minister Roland Dumas, GDR foreign minister Markus Meckel, Federal Germany foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, UK foreign minister Douglas Hurd, and U.S. foreign minister James Baker pictured on the podium at the first 'Two Plus Four' conference in Bonn, Germany, 05 May 1990. It was the first meeting on the way to the Two Plus Four Agreement between the two Germanies and the Four Powers that agreed on the Reunification of Germany.

Martin Athenstädt/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The United States and the NATO Non-extension Assurances of 1990: New Light on an Old Problem?

| Winter 2020/21

Did the Western powers promise in 1990 not to expand NATO? An examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the Russian allegations are by no means baseless, which affects how the U.S.-Russian relationship today is to be understood.

Great Decisions Cover

Foreign Policy Association

Journal Article - Foreign Policy Association

The State of the State Department and American Diplomacy

| Jan. 03, 2019

During the Trump administration, the usual ways of conducting diplomacy have been upended. Many positions in the State Department have never been filled, and meetings with foreign leaders such as Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin have been undertaken with little advance planning. What effect are these changes having now, and how will they affect ongoing relationships between the United States and its allies and adversaries?

People at Seoul Train Station watch a a local news program reporting about a North Korean missile launch. Aug. 30, 2017 (Lee Jin-man/Associated Press).

Lee Jin-man/Associated Press

Journal Article - The RUSI Journal

North Korea’s Missile Programme and Supply-Side Controls: Lessons for Countering Illicit Procurement

| Oct. 17, 2018

Despite one of the most extensive sanctions regimes in history, including an embargo on missile technologies, North Korea has taken huge steps forward in its ballistic missile programme. Daniel Salisbury explores the limitations of, and challenges of implementing, supply-side approaches to missile nonproliferation. Considering North Korea’s recent progress and efforts to evade sanctions, the article highlights the continuing need to strengthen efforts to counter illicit trade in missile-related technologies.

Blogtrepreneur/Flickr

Blogtrepreneur/Flickr

Journal Article - Nonproliferation Review

Solving the Jurisdictional Conundrum: How U.S. Enforcement Agencies Target Overseas Illicit Procurement Networks Using Civil Courts

| September 2018

Over the past two decades, the United States has increasingly turned to targeted sanctions and export restrictions, such as those imposed against Iran and North Korea, in order to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction. One vexing problem, however, is how to contend with jurisdictional hurdles when the violations occur overseas, in countries that are unable or unwilling to assist US enforcement efforts. To solve this problem, US prosecutors are turning to strategies with significant extraterritorial implications—that is, exercising legal authority beyond national borders. One such tool is to use civil legal procedures to seize assets linked to sanctions or export-control violations in jurisdictions that lack cooperative arrangements with US enforcement agencies. While this may be an attractive strategy to bolster enforcement efforts against overseas illicit procurement, using such tools is not without consequence. This article explores the political, legal, and technical implications of enforcing extraterritorial controls against overseas non-state actors by exploring the recent uses of civil-asset forfeiture against Iranian and North Korean procurement networks.