Articles

"Nuclear proliferation is a crime that pays well. Those involved in the Khan network were made very wealthy for their efforts, and the inability of the international community to effectively punish them has resulted in a missed opportunity to provide a deterrent against future black-market salesmen."

"All of these pathologies were evident in the failure to prevent or appropriately respond to the Mumbai attacks. There was in fact significant intelligence suggesting a seaborne terrorist attack was likely, and even that prominent sites such as the Taj Hotel would be targeted. This information, however, was ignored by several key bureaucratic actors—including the Coast Guard and the Maharashtra state director-general of police—because it was deemed unactionable. Others, such as the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad, at least attempted some kind of preparation. The differences in readiness highlight the extent of fragmentation among the security apparatus. Even when Mumbai police tried to take preventive action, they lacked the manpower to sustain increased security at the hotels. Once the attack occurred, the security forces did not have sufficient night-vision equipment, heavy weaponry, or information about the attack sites, leading to a long response time and the emergence of a disastrous siege...."

Policymakers and scholars agree that North Korea’s nuclear program heightens the risk of nuclear transfer to the global black market. Althuogh the North Koreans engage in illicit activity primarily to acquire hard currency, broader economic and ideological factors may also contribute to a decision to export nuclear materials. North Korea also risks losing control over its smuggling networks as it relies more and more on nonstate criminal actors. The United States, then, must seek to develop and employ new strategies to pursue and dismantle these networks as well as offer economic incentives to the regime. In the case of North Korea, countersmuggling and counterproliferation could go hand in hand.