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Historically, most civil wars have ended with the military defeat of the losing side. In the 1990s, by contrast, civil wars usually ended with a negotiated settlement. What accounts for this anomaly?

What kinds of peace agreements are most likely to prevent civil conflicts from recurring? Does holding elections after a civil war make enduring peace more likely? Agreements mandating that rebels be allowed to participate in post-conflict elections alongside the government are more likely to succeed, because such elections attract the engagement of international organizations that can reward compliance with the agreement and punish noncompliance.

In foreign counterinsurgency campaigns from Vietnam to Afghanistan, the United States has often found local elites to be more hindrance than help. Client governments resist U.S.-prescribed reforms crucial to counterinsurgency success because such reforms would undermine their power. The history of the United States’ involvement in El Salvador’s civil war shows that placing strict conditions on military and economic aid is crucial to gaining client governments’ compliance.

The concept of soft balancing first emerged in analyses of other countries’ attempts to counter U.S. primacy through nonmilitary means after the end of the Cold War. Soft balancing is not a new phenomenon, however. In the early twentieth century, Latin American states sought to end the United States’ frequent interventions in the region by creating international norms against military intervention.

Policymakers have long focused on preventing nuclear weapons proliferation by controlling technology. Even developing countries, however, may now possess the technical ability to create nuclear weapons. The history of gas centrifuge development in twenty countries supports this perspective. To reduce the demand for nuclear weapons, policymakers will have look toward the cultural, normative, and political organization of the world.

"Fifty years ago, the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster. Every president since John F. Kennedy has tried to learn from what happened back then," writes Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center and one of the world's foremost experts on the Cuban Missile Crisis. "Today, it can help U.S. policymakers understand what to do -- and what not to do -- about Iran, North Korea, China, and presidential decision-making in general."

Realist scholars have long debated the question of how much power states need to feel secure. Offensive realists claim that states should constantly seek to increase their power. Defensive realists argue that accumulating too much power can be self-defeating. Proponents of hegemonic stability theory contend that the accumulation of capabilities in one state can exert a stabilizing effect on the system. The three schools describe different points along the power con­tinuum. When a state is weak, accumulating power increases its security. This is approximately the situation described by offensive realists. A state that con­tinues to accumulate capabilities will eventually triggers a balancing reaction that puts its security at risk. This scenario accords with defensive realist as­sumptions. Finally, when the state becomes too powerful to balance, its oppo­nents bandwagon with it, and the state’s security begins to increase again. This is the situation described by hegemonic stability theory. These three stages delineate a modified parabolic relationship between power and secu­rity. As a state moves along the power continuum, its security increases up to a point, then decreases, and finally increases again. This modified parabolic re­lationship allows scholars to synthesize previous realist theories into a single framework.