Articles

Nobel Peace Prize laureate Kailash Satyarthi was in Bangladesh this past week launching his global “100 Million for 100 Million” children’s rights campaign. The initiative’s name is derived from a simple but powerful objective: for 100 million young people to pledge to help the 100 million children worldwide who are suffering from the worst forms of exploitation and abuse, including child trafficking, forced labor and prostitution.

Policymakers have long focused on preventing nuclear weapons proliferation by controlling technology. Even developing countries, however, may now possess the technical ability to create nuclear weapons. The history of gas centrifuge development in twenty countries supports this perspective. To reduce the demand for nuclear weapons, policymakers will have look toward the cultural, normative, and political organization of the world.

Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," was published by in the Summer 2009 issue of International Security. In his article, Dr. Fuhrmann argues "Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs."

"All of these pathologies were evident in the failure to prevent or appropriately respond to the Mumbai attacks. There was in fact significant intelligence suggesting a seaborne terrorist attack was likely, and even that prominent sites such as the Taj Hotel would be targeted. This information, however, was ignored by several key bureaucratic actors—including the Coast Guard and the Maharashtra state director-general of police—because it was deemed unactionable. Others, such as the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad, at least attempted some kind of preparation. The differences in readiness highlight the extent of fragmentation among the security apparatus. Even when Mumbai police tried to take preventive action, they lacked the manpower to sustain increased security at the hotels. Once the attack occurred, the security forces did not have sufficient night-vision equipment, heavy weaponry, or information about the attack sites, leading to a long response time and the emergence of a disastrous siege...."

"He again has demonstrators on the streets. And, he has lost the one principal opposition leader with whom he appeared to be able to work," said Xenia Dormandy, director of the Project on India and the subcontinent at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. "It is unclear whether whoever replaces Benazir will hold the same accommodative views as she did."

"The government of President Pervez Musharraf is facing policy failure in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Taliban forces and their sympathizers are becoming entrenched in the region and are aggressively expanding their influence and operations (especially in Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province). A lethal combination of Musharraf's political predicament and declining public support, a significant rise in suicide attacks targeting the army and the reluctance of soldiers deputed in the area to engage tribal gangs militarily further exacerbates this impasse...."

It is widely recognized that access by belligerent groups to the gains from drug production and trafficking contributes to the intensity and prolongation of military conflict. Also, that such groups—terrorists, insurgents, or warlords—grow stronger when they successfully exploit the drug trade. The United States' response—its antinarcotics policy— emphasizes crop eradication. This strategy is too simplistic and, ultimately, ineffective.

Nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people.

Paradoxically, counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan frequently complicate counterterrorism and counterinsurgency objectives and can even undermine democratization. Counternarcotics strategy should concentrate instead on strengthening the Afghan state’s capacity.