Articles

5 Items

Memorial to Iranian Murdered scientists of Iran's Nuclear program.

Wikimedia CC

Magazine Article - TLS (Times Literary Supplement)

Take Out the Driver

| June 05, 2018

Calder Walton reviews Rise and Kill First by Ronen Bergman. He writes that the book not only sheds light on Israel's intelligence services, but also has wider significance: how and why a state uses extra-judicial killing—and the consequences of doing so.

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Journal Article - H-Diplo

H-Diplo Article Review No. 750—'Missing Revolution: The American Intelligence Failure in Iraq, 1958'

    Author:
  • Salim Yaqub
| Mar. 15, 2018

"Jeffrey Karam is to be commended for writing such a richly researched and cogently reasoned article, one that invites invigorating reexamination, by historians and political scientists alike, of a pivotal moment in modern Middle Eastern history."

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Journal Article - H-Diplo

H-Diplo Roundtable XIX, 18 on America's Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National Security State

| Jan. 15, 2018

International Security Program Postdoctoral Fellow Jeffrey G. Karam reviewed America’s Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National Security State by Osamah F. Khalil.

Sen. Angus King of Maine

Stephanie Mitchell/Harvard Staff Photographer

Newspaper Article - Harvard Gazette

Senator Angus King: ‘We know’ Russia Hacked Election

    Author:
  • Christina Pazzanese
| Nov. 28, 2017

Though President Trump says he is not convinced that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election, U.S. Sen. Angus King of Maine said Monday that he and his colleagues on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which is probing the matter, have “no doubt whatsoever” of Moscow’s involvement.

Military vehicles move slowly through the crowded streets in Baghdad, Iraq, July 14, 1958.

AP

Journal Article - Intelligence and National Security

Missing Revolution: The American Intelligence Failure in Iraq, 1958

| October 2017

Why were American officials caught by surprise with the military coup and later revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958? Drawing on American intelligence and diplomatic records as well as multilingual sources, this article argues that the US intelligence failure is the product of two factors: the collection of information from too few and too similar human sources of intelligence in Iraq's ruling regime, and the unreceptivity of US officials to assessing new information and their unwillingness to update assessments of local Iraqi developments. It revisits America's intelligence failure in Iraq and suggests important lessons for the study of intelligence.