News & Announcements

Following the breakdown of  the Trump-Kim Summit in Hanoi, Belfer Center Korea experts Matthew Bunn, Nicholas Burns, Martin Malin, Joseph Nye, Gary Samore, Wendy Sherman, and Jon Wolfsthal react to the collapse of the talks and suggest steps the United States should take now.

In advance of the Trump-Kim Summit in Hanoi February 27-28, Belfer Center experts offer a reality check on the negotiation over nuclear issues.

In the turbulent times of difficult EU-US relations, Brexit, and rising nationalism in Europe, this course analyses the impressive extent of EU presence in the developing world. It first introduces theories, concepts and decision-making processes related to EU foreign policy (by both Member States and EU institutions). In particular, we analyse the processes within the European Communities, and the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policies) / CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policies) frameworks. The course then critically assesses security and economic policies towards the developing world. Themes to explain the nature of contemporary EU foreign policies include: European integration (intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, neoliberalism and ethical foreign policy), diplomacy, post-colonialism, military and civilian means for conflict-management, and also policies on migration, asylum and

The historic summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore this month (June 12) has drawn both skepticism and optimism from experts. A panel of senior American and South Korean diplomats with experience negotiating with North Korea weighed in at an event hosted by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs’ Korea Working Group on Tuesday (June 19).

Belfer Center experts offer insight and analysis of the Trump-Kim summit through statements and interviews.

Belfer Center expert looks at potential progress, fallout from the North, South Korea meeting

The last time that America almost risked a pre-emptive strike on North Korea the gamble offered a spectacular pay-off. Ashton Carter, a leading architect of that plan, recalls that his scheme for bombing the Yongbyon nuclear facility in 1994 assumed that in one or two days the entirety of the regime’s nuclear programme could be levelled and entombed in rubble. Mr Carter, who went on to become defence secretary in the Obama administration, now thinks that an American first strike would only put “a significant dent” in North Korea’s arsenal of nuclear devices and bombmaking sites. “The difference today is that the North Koreans are very good at hiding, burying and moving around their nuclear infrastructure,” says Mr Carter, now at Harvard University.