Policy Briefs & Testimonies

The authors break down the reasons for the United States to stay in the Paris Climate Agreement, arguing that the benefits far outweigh any potential costs. The Agreement gives the United States a seat at the table, and the ability to influence international policy on climate change, showing that the United States is open and willing to cooperate.

The author explores the role of the Montreal Protocol's assessment panel and draws lessons for the UNFCCC.

The authors explore, in particular, the implications for CO2 removal and solar geoengineering of the Paris Agreement's long-term temperature goals, provision for "removals by sinks," and market-based mitigation mechanisms.

The emerging pledge and review approach to international climate policy provides countries with substantial discretion in how they craft their intended emission mitigation contributions. The resulting heterogeneity in mitigation pledges places significant demands for a well-functioning transparency and review mechanism. In particular, the specific forms of intended contributions necessitate economic analysis in order to estimate the aggregate effects of these contributions as well as to permit "apples-to-apples" comparisons of mitigation efforts. This paper discusses the tools that can inform such analyses as well as the institutional needs of climate transparency.

Recent research in economics shows how not to design climate treaties—and suggests how to get it right.

Robert Stavins argues for an economic approach to solving environmental problems and explains why "environmental economics" is not an oxymoron.

The authors explore a novel approach to evaluating the ambition and fairness of countries' voluntary pledges to reduce emissions. This approach could facilitate negotiations at the upcoming UN climate conference in Lima—and the broader process leading to a new 2015 international climate agreement.