Reports & Papers

The paper provides a detailed analysis of the contemporary Sino-Indian conventional ground and nuclear force balances and carefully reconstructs how mutual developments in these areas are perceived by both New Delhi and Beijing.

As India’s civilian nuclear energy program expands with the assistance of international nuclear suppliers, it creates new potential pathways to the acquisition of fissile material that could be diverted for military purposes. A key question is whether and how India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities are separated. In this discussion paper from the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom, Kalman A. Robertson and John Carlson argue that India has not established a complete and verifiable separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs. The authors recommend steps for India to take under its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide assurances to all states that components of its civilian program are not contributing to the growth of its nuclear arsenal. These steps include renouncing options that would facilitate the use of safeguarded items to produce unsafeguarded nuclear material, and placing the proliferation-sensitive components of its nuclear power industry under continuous safeguards.

In 1996, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States and the Russian Federation entered into a cooperative effort – the Trilateral Initiative – aimed at investigating the feasibility and requirements for a verification system under which the IAEA could accept and monitor nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components pursuant to the NPT Article VI commitments of both States. Although the Initiative ended in 2002, the Model Verification Agreement produced could still serve as the basis for bilateral or multilateral agreements between the IAEA and nuclear-weapon States.

In this paper, Thomas E. Shea and Laura Rockwood examine the potential role for international verification of fissile material in relation to nuclear disarmament, what was accomplished under the Trilateral Initiative and, more importantly, what should be done now to preserve its legacy and take concrete steps towards such verification.

Part of NTI's Innovating Verification reports series, Verifying Baseline Declarations of Nuclear Warheads and Materials analyzes how baseline declarations can contribute to near- and long-term arms control and non-proliferation goals and how to verify them without compromising sensitive information.

The Ambassador of the Republic of India to the United States, Dr. S. Jaishankar, delivered an address entitled “India-U.S. Ties: The Long View” and led a discussion with experts, fellows and students on April 17 as part of the Future of Diplomacy Project’s third annual “South Asia Week.”

Ambassador Marc Grossman writes about his experience negotiating with the Taliban from 2010-2011.

Only two weeks after national elections in Nepal, the country’s Ambassador to the US, Dr. Shankar P. Sharma, addressed an audience of Nepali ex-patriots, Harvard Kennedy School students and expert faculty at a presentation jointly hosted by the Kennedy School’s India and South Asia Program, the South Asia Institute and the Center for Public Leadership in an “off-the-record” presentation on December 3, 2013.

Minister Khurshid addressed a crowd of students, faculty and guests at the Harvard Kennedy School as part of the India & South Asia Program’s international speaker series, co-sponsored by Harvard’s South Asia Initiative. His comments on Tuesday, October 1, 2013, followed a series of meetings at the United Nations in New York.

This paper studies under what conditions the U.S. can coerce its allies to forgo nuclear weapons. Specifically, why did Taiwan and South Korea give up their nuclear pursuits under American duress, while Israel and Pakistan attained a nuclear capability?