Reports & Papers

The authors conducted a survey of joint terminal attack controllers. Their responses indicate that the A-10 is vastly more capable than its proposed replacement at providing highly precise CAS. A cost analysis demonstrates that the replacement plan would also waste billions of dollars. The A-10 fleet just received a service life extension through 2035, and is relatively affordable to operate. In stark contrast the F-35s that would replace the A-10s entail staggeringly high procurement and operating costs.

As part of its Maritime Asia project, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) conducted a workshop focused on naval developments in Asia. The purpose of this workshop was to explore the interaction between China's ongoing naval modernization and the navy modernization programs that most of China's neighbors are pursuing.

The proliferation of threat systems and Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies make performing special operations forces' (SOF) air mobility missions increasingly complicated and limit the capability to defeat air defenses and penetrate into denied airspace. Combined with an aging inventory, ill suited to evading these threats, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) must look to technology to defeat the more modern threat systems and anti-access strategies. The best answer to penetrate future, denied regions is in stealth or low observable (LO) technology.

This paper examines the state of Syria's regional armed group allies today in the face of Syrian decline.

The United States has a complex, multi-agency structure to plan, synchronize, and execute foreign policy and national security. By statute, the State Department is the lead agency for foreign policy. However, in practice, the much larger and better-funded Department of Defense conducts much of America's foreign policy activity, often with little coordination with the State Department or other relevant agencies. Over the past two decades, the military's Geographic Combatant Commands have taken an increasing lead in planning and executing foreign policy activities around the world. This has often effectively put a military face and voice on America's foreign policy, sometimes to the detriment of broader U.S. goals and relationships. More effective U.S. foreign policy requires greater interagency coordination at all levels and a greater role for the State Department as America's lead agency for foreign policy.

With the United States currently engaged in difficult and taxing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, renewed emphasis has been focused upon the country's capabilities and priorities vis-à-vis this type of warfare.  Within the military, the Air Force has been especially and increasingly criticized for being too enamored with a Cold-War era conventionally minded force structure and for not shifting aggressively to meet the threats of COIN-style conflicts that many predict will be pervasive throughout the Global War on Terror.

This paper addresses the conceptual capabilities and limitations of air power in COIN in order to illuminate how the Air Force can leverage the distinct asymmetric advantage that air power presents across the spectrum of conflict.  This asymmetry is founded upon a clear U.S. superiority in air power capabilities combined with the unique flexibility inherent in air power.  An understanding of air power's efficacy in COIN, measured against conventional requirements and capabilities, will inform decisions on appropriate force structure and employment.

Carter and Perry call for a two-pronged strategy towards China: one prong of engagement to encourage China to be a "responsible stakeholder" and another prong of hedging against the prospect of a downturn in relations.