Reports & Papers

Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine illuminated the long profound shadow of nuclear weapons over international security. Russia's nuclear threats have rightfully garnered significant attention because of the unfathomable lethality of nuclear weapons. However, the use of such weapons in Ukraine is only one way—albeit the gravest— that Russia could challenge the global nuclear order. Russia's influence extends deep into the very fabric of this order—a system to which it is inextricably bound by Moscow's position in cornerstone institutions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). From withdrawing from key treaties to stymieing resolutions critical of misconduct, Moscow has demonstrated its ability to challenge the legitimacy, relevance, and interpretations of numerous standards and principles espoused by the West.

In this American Academy of Arts and Sciences study, Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Stephen Herzog, Wilfred Wan, and Doreen Horschig unpack the challenges to the global nuclear order posed by the Russian war against Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded nonnuclear-armed Ukraine and leveraged threats with its nuclear arsenal as a “shield” to deter third-party intervention. The well-publicized horrors on the ground in Ukraine are, unfortunately, not the only consequences of Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbor. The war is having unmistakable effects on how governments, scholars, and the public think about nuclear arms. Not only has Moscow reintroduced the world to the often-unsavory realities of nuclear deterrence, but its suspension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and deratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been setbacks for arms control and disarmament. Meanwhile, vulnerable states around the globe may be further incentivized to develop nuclear weapons or seek protection from nuclear-armed patrons to avoid being invaded like Ukraine. Given these changing geopolitical circumstances, how might the Russian war on Ukraine affect the global nuclear order? The authors in this publication conclude that the United States and the broader international community must now more seriously engage with alternatives to traditional arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament endeavors. Specifically, the authors discuss the increasing prominence of approaches such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)—popularly known as the Nuclear Ban—and risk reduction measures. They assess whether these initiatives can have an impact in reducing nuclear dangers. Additionally, they examine temptations for states to pursue more forceful counterproliferation measures and describe the risks of doing so.

Herzog, Baron, and Gibbons (HBG) thank Haley Daarstad, RyuGyung Park, and Timea Balogh for replicating their 2022 short article in The Journal of Politics. In that article, HBG tested the malleability of U.S. public support for nuclear disarmament, specifically in the context of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Their survey experiment reveals that––despite majority public support for eliminating nuclear weapons––Americans’ backing of the TPNW can be significantly attenuated by exposure to elite and group cues opposing the treaty. The resultant article has received considerable attention from policymakers and anti-nuclear activists alike. Daarstad, Park, and Balogh (DPB) offer three main substantive points of comment on HGB's article. First, DPB indicate that the results successfully replicate and note that they “do not find any coding errors that undermine the authors’ analysis or conclusions.” Second, DPB show that the findings also replicate when partisan leaners are coded as political Independents. Finally, and most interestingly, DPB conduct gender-based subgroup analysis and show that there are heterogenous treatment effects among male and female respondents in our sample. HBG address each of these points in turn.

By looking beyond solely Iran’s security motivations, this paper by Sahar Nowrouzzadeh seeks to inform more holistic negotiation strategies that can potentially influence Iran’s nuclear decision-making in a manner more favorable to U.S. interests.

The development of North Korea’s nuclear program has been accompanied by a spectrum of emotions, from fear to anxiety, from resentment to amazement. Despite its isolation, North Korea has continued its relentless pursuit of nuclear capabilities. While angering neighboring countries, North Korea has equally demonstrated an unparalleled resolve, unwavering commitment to its security ambitions, and extraordinary ingenuity in overcoming the international sanction regime’s technical challenges. Whereas the debate over North Korea, especially in the West, has been predominantly confined to the discussion over its nuclear arsenal, its delivery system, and its ill-formed nuclear posture, much less has been discussed over the nuclear safety culture that ultimately rules over the management of an ever-extending nuclear infrastructure. And in the debate that does exist in this regard, diverging views have emerged. For some commentators, the fact that North Korea has never witnessed a major nuclear accident is simply a miracle. For others, the depiction of North Korea as a “walking nuclear disaster in waiting” is not only exaggerated but also merely inaccurate

China launched its nuclear-weapon program in 1955 and began producing HEU and plutonium in 1964 and 1966, respectively. China exploded its first fission device (HEU-based) on October 16, 1964 and detonated its first hydrogen bomb on June 14, 1967. Since its first nuclear explosion, China has maintained a nuclear policy featuring a no-first-use pledge. China ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on March 9, 1992. China has kept secret information about its fissile materials and nuclear weapons stocks. It is estimated that China had about 360 warheads in 2020, slowly increasing over recent decades. The U.S. missile-defense program is a major driver of China’s nuclear-weapon modernization, which includes an expansion of its nuclear arsenal and more and improved intercontinental ballistic missiles. China conducted 45 nuclear tests from 1964 to 1996 at its Lop Nor site in Xinjiang. Its last nuclear test was in July 1996. In September 1996, China signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty but has not yet ratified it. Most likely, China is waiting to see if the U.S. will ratify.

The world has grown more dangerous but also less open to arms control measures that could limit some of the dangers. What can be done? Steven E. Miller offers a tour de force overview of both dismal and hopeful trends within arms control over the past decades, in this first paper of a new HCSS series on Arms Control.

Under the guidance of its self-defence nuclear strategy, China will continue to modernise its nuclear force in order to maintain a reliable second-strike retaliatory capability. China’s nuclear weapon modernisation has been responsive to the advances of military capabilities of other countries, particularly the US. As Hu Side emphasised, “The sole purpose for China to maintain a limited nuclear counterattack force is to deter a potential nuclear strike. However, the development of US missile defense and the long-rang strike capability with high accuracy to target mobile missiles is in practice to decrease the effectiveness of Chinese nuclear deterrence. Thus, it surely leads to Chinese attention."

Recently published documents, news reports, and other sources of open source information indicate that China is accelerating its current nuclear force modernization programme. It is clear that it is driven largely in response to the growing United States (U.S.) missile defense program, which China perceives as a threat to its minimum credible deterrence. While China is not altering its nuclear doctrine, it believes that it needs to enhance the reliability, survivability, and effectiveness of its retaliatory capability in response to a first-strike. In addition to expanding the size of its nuclear arsenal, it is enhancing its delivery capabilities, for example, by increasing the number of ICBMs and making them more sophisticated. It is building more Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads as well as a new class of ballistic missile submarines. China’s ongoing nuclear modernization aims to increase the survivability, reliability, safety, and penetration capability of its small nuclear arsenal and thereby assures a limited, reliable, and effective counterattack capability that will deter a nuclear first-strike. China’s nuclear modernization program will likely continue to be guided by its nuclear policy, which is characterized by a no-first-use pledge and a commitment to “minimum nuclear deterrence.” Finally, while China supports the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it does not believe it is in China’s interest to participate in discussions about nuclear disarmament until the U.S. and Russia reduce their arsenals to one thousand each, or lower.

While the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted nuclear facilities, it is not the first crisis to do so. This paper will review the findings from the handbook published by Kings College and the Stimson Center, “Nuclear Security in Times of Crisis.” The handbook draws on lessons learned from four case studies that examine what happens to nuclear security during emergencies. Each case varies in terms of cause, scale, and duration, while the lessons are broadly applicable to nuclear facilities and regulatory bodies. Each case identifies steps taken to protect nuclear facilities and identifies areas for improvement.