Reports & Papers

This book is intended to advance the next phase of the U.S.-Colombia relationship. In a rapidly changing world, the following chapters present a roadmap for a new type of engagement that challenges our ambitions and extends the ties that bind our countries. 

In late 2017, Mexico made headlines as Italian company Enel bid what was then a world-record low price for renewable energy in the country’s third such energy auction. This development was possible due to the historical and sweeping energy reforms passed with broad support in Mexico in 2013. Then-President Enrique Peña Nieto had succeeded where previous Mexican presidents had failed, reversing decades of resource nationalism and overhauling the energy sector through constitutional reforms that gave the private sector a larger role and advantaged renewable energy in Mexico’s economy. The 2017 auction seemed to indicate Mexico’s bright future not only as a conventional oil producer, but also as a clean energy power.

To support the commission, CSIS convened a series of working groups to address a range of issue-specific areas that are critical for reconstruction and modernization of the Ukrainian economy, including agriculture, energy, and transportation and logistics, as well as addressing the impact of corruption on private sector investment.

Experience has shown that countries should begin planning for the postwar period before the end of a war. The geostrategic stakes in Ukraine are such that failure could have disastrous consequences not just for Ukraine but also for the broader region. The war has already caused repercussions around the world through global food insecurity, a growing energy crisis, and disruptions of the broader global supply chains. It is in the national security interest of the G7 and European Union for Ukraine to become a modernized economy and remain a secure democracy.

The United States, European Union, and G7 should do everything possible to realize this vision after Ukraine wins the war with Russia. However, there will not be enough foreign assistance to rebuild Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine and its allies need to create an environment within which businesses and companies have the confidence to invest and deliver the reconstruction the country critically needs.

This report is made possible by general support to CSIS and the support of the Royal Danish Embassy. 

Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky serves as Co-Chair of the Commission tasked with creating the report.

For this Future of Diplomacy Project anniversary publication, we have asked many of our former fellows to reflect on the geostrategic challenges ahead for diplomacy and statecraft and to offer their advice to the younger generation of rising leaders on the opportunities and challenges for diplomacy in the decade ahead.

Mis and disinformation thrive by capturing imaginations through obfuscation, oversimplification, and speculation. In contrast, this report documents and analyzes five key areas related to the shifting information threat landscape in the 2020 U.S. general election with clarity, in their complexity, and on the basis of rigorously collected data. Our goal is to provide relevant insights for future elections in an evolving information and threat landscape.

The 2020 election presents a paradox. Despite dramatic changes to the election process due to the COVID-19 pandemic and increasingly complex threats since the 2016 election, 2020 is widely regarded as “the most secure [election] in American history.” Operationally, it was also one of the smoothest. State and local election officials overcame unprecedented challenges and scarce resources to administer an election with fewer incidents of cyber compromises, technical failures or long lines than anticipated. After Election Day, recount procedures functioned as designed. Yet, amidst these successes, officials from both parties faced a barrage of mis- and disinformation about the election process that served to undermine confidence in the result.

Though the election security ecosystem survived the triple threat of cybersecurity, physical security, and mis- and disinformation in 2020, this success will prove to be hard to replicate in future election cycles without proper investment and reinforcement.

Many of the most serious challenges the United States will face in 2021 and beyond will require our diplomats to take the lead. These include the return of great power competition, leading a global response to the pandemic and its consequences, supporting American companies overseas during a devastating recession, mounting a major effort on climate change, negotiating an end to the Afghan and Iraq wars, and helping American citizens in every corner of the world who need the support of their government. Morale in the State Department, however, is at an all-time low and efforts to promote greater racial and ethnic diversity have failed just when the country needs women and men of all backgrounds as our primary link to nearly every country in the world. There are challenges to be met inside the Foreign Service, including an honest self-assessment of the Service’s internal culture.

The Belfer National Cyber Power Index (NCPI) measures 30 countries cyber capabilities in the context of seven national objectives, using 32 intent indicators and 27 capability indicators with evidence collected from publicly available data.

Influence Operations (IO), also known as Information Operations, are a series of warfare tactics historically used to collect information, influence, or disrupt the decision making of an adversary. IO strategies intentionally disseminate information to manipulate public opinion and/or influence behavior. IO can involve a number of tactics, including spreading false information intentionally. This is known as “disinformation.”   

Skilled influence operations often deliberately spread disinformation in highly public places like social media. This is done in the hope that people who have no connection to the operation will mistakenly share this disinformation. Inaccurate information spread in error without malicious intent is known as “misinformation.” 

This playbook explores mis- and disinformation incidents that specifically focus on elections operations and infrastructure. Election officials may not often see or know what the motivation is behind the incidents encountered or whether they are mis- or disinformation. Throughout these guides we refer to mis/disinformation incidents together, as the strategies for countering or responding to them are the same.  

This section of the Playbook includes recommendations and materials focused on the response process. It will help election officials respond to election-related mis and disinformation incidents quickly and in a coordinated fashion. 

In this playbook, we refer to mis/disinformation throughout as one concept. Instances of both misinformation and disinformation in the elections process provide incorrect information to voters. Incorrect information can be conveyed intentionally or unintentionally. For election officials, any incorrect information, regardless of source or intention, presented to voters can pose a threat to elections, because it can undermine voters’ understanding of and trust in the election.