Reports & Papers

8 Items

A worker cleans glass panels of the Bank of China headquarters building near a decoration setup for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2018. Chinese President Xi Jinping will chair the forum held in the capital city from Sept. 3-4, 2023.

AP Photo/Andy Wong

Paper

China's 21st Century Aspirational Empire

| May 2023

This paper addresses the question of how the Chinese party-state chooses to exercise its economic, financial, diplomatic, military and soft power in the next 25 years will make a great difference to US national security and foreign policy, and to developments in the rest of the world. The paper makes three key points:

The core argument of this paper is that Beijing will likely aspire to pursue an empire-like position globally, not just seek an Asia-Pacific sphere of influence, and that this aspiration will founder. Achieving an empire-like position is both an imperative and is infeasible. The tensions between goal and reality will likely characterize China’s role in the world in coming decades and will be central to the difficulties of US-China relations. Second, there is heuristic value for US policymakers and analysts to consider a 20-year outlook on the rise of China that encompasses China’s pursuit of a global empire-like position. Third, paying close attention to how Beijing organizes its own government, corporate, and non-governmental organizations to seek an empire-like position will provide important signposts emerging tension and trends.

Tractors on Westminster bridge

AP/Matt Dunham

Paper - Institut für Sicherheitspolitik

The Global Order After COVID-19

| 2020

Despite the far-reaching effects of the current pandemic,  the essential nature of world politics will not be transformed. The territorial state will remain the basic building-block of international affairs, nationalism will remain a powerful political force, and the major powers will continue to compete for influence in myriad ways. Global institutions, transnational networks, and assorted non-state actors will still play important roles, of course, but the present crisis will not produce a dramatic and enduring increase in global governance or significantly higher levels of international cooperation. In short, the post-COVID-19 world will be less open, less free, less prosperous, and more competitive than the world many people expected to emerge only a few years ago.

Report - Stimson Center

Pakistan, India, and China After the U.S. Drawdown from Afghanistan

| January 2015

This paper examines the strategic future of South Asia in the wake of the U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan through three key research questions: first, how does the U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan affect the regional security and economic interests of India, Pakistan, and China? Secondly, what kinds of responses to terror attacks by India, Pakistan, and China could further destabilize the region? Thirdly, what key steps can the United States take to prevent further instability in this context?

Report - Danish Institute for International Studies

Great Power Politics and the Ukrainian Crisis: NATO, EU and Russia after 2014

| 2014

This report assesses the relationship between Europe and Russia as the sum of great power reactions to the Ukrainian crisis and Russia's annexation of Crimea. Despite agreement on a no business-as-usual principle, important national nuances have arisen stemming from different historical bonds to eastern Europe and Russia (Germany, Poland, United States) or different interests in the region (France, United Kingdom).

The No.1 and No. 2 reactors at the Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant in Lianyungang city, China, 22 Mar. 2009. The Tianwan power plant is designed to have eight reactors.

AP Photo

Paper

China's Current Spent Fuel Management and Future Management Scenarios

| July 2010

China's recent nuclear energy ambitions have put it in the forefront of research and development in the nuclear industry.This paper will first discuss the status of China's current spent fuel management methods and storage capability. Second, this paper will estimate and calculate the accumulated spent fuel and required spent fuel storage up to 2040 based on three different nuclear development scenarios. Third, future spent fuel management scenarios from now to 2040 are designed and financial costs and proliferation risks are evaluated and discussed associated with each scenario. Last, policy recommendations will be provided for the future spent fuel.

Report - United Nations

The Biofuels Market: Current Situation and Alternative Scenarios

    Author:
  • United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
| 2009

The purpose of this volume is to present possible scenarios for the biofuels industry. Each chapter describes how the sector could evolve depending on the policy and strategies that individual countries may select. However, the assumption is that individual choices may have global impacts. Each scenario therefore tries to provide insights on the global economic, energetic, environmental and trade repercussions of specific policy developments.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair listens to a student explaining the biofuel crops and research carried out at an experimental farm at Pretoria University in Pretoria, South Africa, June 1, 2007.

AP Photo

Report Chapter

Advanced Biofuels and Developing Countries: Intellectual Property Scenarios and Policy Implications

| 2009

"Chapter III analysed the commercial viability of second generation biofuels. This chapter focuses on related intellectual property rights (IPRs) aspects. Three hypothetical scenarios in the context of the intellectual property protection of second generation biofuels are developed, with each scenario representing a different level of strictness of protection. Therefore, each scenario translates into a different level of potential access to advanced biofuel technologies by developing countries."