Reports & Papers

24 Items

Paper - Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center

Iran and a New International Framework for Nuclear Energy

| November 2016

As early as the end of the Second World War it was recognized that nuclear fuel cycle technologies developed for military purposes—specifically, uranium enrichment and reprocessing—had major potential for peaceful applications but remained inherently dual-purpose, and if not controlled appropriately, could be diverted to military use. The very first issue considered by the newly founded United Nations was “the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy.”

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The Energy Implications of a Nuclear Deal between the P5+1 and Iran

| July 14, 2015

On June 23 and 24, twenty five experts met at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government under the auspices of the Geopolitics of Energy Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The group, which included experts from academia, the financial sector, government, and the energy industry, spent an evening and the following full day discussing and debating the possible energy implications of a nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran.

Report - Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center

Fresh Ideas for the Future: Symposium on the NPT

| April 26, 2015

The abstracts in this booklet summarise the research presented at an academic symposium convened on the sidelines of the 2015 NPT Review Conference. As we write this, journalists and seasoned experts in the nuclear policy field have been speculating about the particularly difficult challenges facing the Review Conference this year. To address those challenges, we would urge all concerned to consider the ideas and analyses presented at this symposium. Experts would be hard-pressed to find a better collection of fresh ideas and approaches for assessing and strengthening the NPT.

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Nuclear Iran: A Glossary

| March 2015 update

This Policy Focus is intended to improve comprehension of the main issues and important technical details surrounding Iran's nuclear program. The core of the document explains the terms used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the world’s watchdog in ensuring that nuclear science and technology are used for peaceful purposes only.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton, and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif discuss the Iran nuclear negotiations in Vienna, Austria, October 2014.


Paper - Institute for Science and International Security

Provisions to Limit Future Iranian Illicit Procurements for Its Nuclear Programs

| November 20, 2014

This proliferation-sensitive procurement architecture should remain in place for the duration of the comprehensive agreement. The six powers must carefully plan for eventualities now and design and implement an architecture that prevents future Iranian illicit procurements under a comprehensive agreement.

Closed-door Iran nuclear talks in Vienna, March 2014.



The Iranian Nuclear Programme: Practical Parameters for a Credible Long-Term Agreement

| November 2014

Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are continuing negotiations to achieve a comprehensive nuclear agreement. Whilst the wider political context to such an agreement is of importance, the key concern at this stage of the negotiations must revolve around ensuring that any agreement guarantees Iran is left without a pathway to making nuclear weapons.

Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, August 20, 2010.

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Report - Institute for Science and International Security

“The Six’s” Guiding Principles in Negotiating with Iran

| July 22, 2014

The recent negotiations in Vienna have shown that the principles driving the positions of the “The Six”--the United States, Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia--differ markedly from those of Iran. Based on several discussions with senior members of the Six, the principles underpinning a deal must include: 1) sufficient response time in case of violations; 2) a nuclear program meeting Iran’s practical needs; 3) adequate irreversibility of constraints; 4) stable provisions; and 5) adequate verification.

Britain's Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart signs the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at Lancaster House, London, watched by the Soviet Ambassador (left) and the US Ambassador (right). July 1, 1968.

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Five Challenging Decades of IAEA Safeguards

| July 2014

Since 1972, IAEA safeguards has played a pivotal role in providing assurances that states live up to their NPT commitments. Today, the NPT and the IAEA continue to remain as foundations to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and preventing proliferation. Over the span of time over which international safeguards has been around, it has been far from a static story.

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Pantex Plant is the only U.S. serial  production facility.


Report - Nuclear Threat Initiative

Innovating Verification: New Tools & New Actors to Reduce Nuclear Risks

  • Verifying Baseline Declarations of Nuclear Warheads and Materials Working Group
| July 2014

Part of NTI's Innovating Verification reports series, Verifying Baseline Declarations of Nuclear Warheads and Materials analyzes how baseline declarations can contribute to near- and long-term arms control and non-proliferation goals and how to verify them without compromising sensitive information.