Africa

40 Items

Jens Stoltenberg speaks to students at the Harvard Kennedy School.

Bennett Craig

Speech

The Three Ages of NATO: An Evolving Alliance

| Sep. 23, 2016

Jens Stoltenberg,NATO Secretary General, discussed the future of the NATO alliance during this speech, given at the Harvard Kennedy School on September 23, 2016. He described the alliance as a responsive organization, capable of adapting to changes in the international security landscape but committed to the continuity of its founding values. In particular, he emphasized the necessity of maintaining a policy of absolute solidarity among member states, especially  in light of the exacerbating civil war in Syria and Russia’s aggressive stance toward countries to the East of NATO member state borders.

News

Former NATO Secretary-General Stresses the Need for Stronger Transatlantic Partnership and U.S. Leadership

Mar. 07, 2015

Former Prime Minister of Denmark and former Secretary-General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, delivered an address titled “America and Europe: Quo Vadis?” in March for the Future of Diplomacy Project's annual Europe Week. Prime Minister Rsamussen led a discussion with students, fellows, and faculty on the need for a stronger transatlantic alliance and American leadership to build a “global alliance of liberal democracies” in the 21st century. Prime Minister Rasmussen examined topical issues ranging from unrest in regional hotspots in the Middle East and Ukraine, to threats to liberal democracy, to challenges to U.S. supremacy.

Report - Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center

Advancing Nuclear Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals

In the lead-up to the nuclear security summit, Advancing Nuclear Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals outlines what was accomplished in a four-year effort launched in 2009 to secure nuclear material around the globe—and what remains to be done. The effort made significant progress, but some weapons-usable nuclear materials still remain “dangerously vulnerable." The authors highlight the continuing danger of nuclear and radiological terrorism and call for urgent action.

In this March 2, 2011 photo, Libyan protesters burn copies of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's "Green Book" during a demonstration against him in Benghazi, eastern Libya.

AP Photo/ Kevin Frayer

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene

| September 2013

"The biggest misconception about NATO's intervention is that it saved lives and benefited Libya and its neighbors. In reality, when NATO intervened in mid-March 2011, Qaddafi already had regained control of most of Libya, while the rebels were retreating rapidly toward Egypt. Thus, the conflict was about to end, barely six weeks after it started, at a toll of about 1,000 dead, including soldiers, rebels, and civilians caught in the crossfire. By intervening, NATO enabled the rebels to resume their attack, which prolonged the war for another seven months and caused at least 7,000 more deaths."

The newly renovated United Nations Security Council Chambers, also known as the Norwegian Room, is seen before the reopening ceremony, Tuesday, April 16, 2013 at U.N. headquarters.

AP Photo/Mary Altaffer

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to Protect

    Author:
  • Aidan Hehir
| Summer 2013

Many observers heralded the Security Council–sanctioned intervention in Libya in March 2011 as evidence of the efficacy of the responsibility to protect (R2P). Although there is no doubt that the intervention was significant, the implications of Resolution 1973 are not as profound as some have claimed. The intervention certainly coheres with the spirit of R2P, but it is possible to situate it in the context of a trajectory of Security Council responses to large-scale intrastate crises that predate the emergence of R2P. This trajectory is a function of the decisionmaking of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5), a group guided by politics and pragmatism rather than principles. As a consequence, the Security Council’s record in dealing with intrastate crises is characterized by a preponderance of inertia punctuated by aberrant flashes of resolve and timely action impelled by the occasional coincidence of interests and humanitarian need, rather than an adherence to either law or norms. The underlying factors that contributed to this record of inconsistency—primarily the P5’s veto power—remain post-Libya, and thus the international response to intrastate crises likely will continue to be inconsistent.