Asia & the Pacific

"A negotiated solution would require a military stalemate on the ground, and this depends on NATO forces guaranteeing that Afghan forces in key positions will not be overrun. This is the political objective that should inform Western military support in Afghanistan from here on out: to make clear to the Taliban that they can achieve more through a peace deal than through fighting and to make clear to Western electorates that this isn't a forever war."

The Project on Managing the Atom offers fellowships for pre-doctoral, post-doctoral, and mid-career researchers for one year, with a possibility for renewal, in the stimulating environment of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. The online application for 2016-2017 fellowships opened December 15, 2015, and the application deadline is January 15, 2016. Recommendation letters are due by February 1, 2016.

"It is now abundantly clear that military force, with or without American troops, will not bring about an end to the war. Afghanistan needs substantial, long-term, international support, including to its security forces. But the best chance of securing a 'responsible end' to the conflict is through the establishment of a structured and inclusive peace process."

"The future of international engagement in Afghanistan — centered around a U.S.-Afghanistan axis — is disturbingly uncertain. Dwindling U.S. interest in Afghanistan is now overlaid by exasperation, and the temptation is to walk away. But the right response to the crisis is to stay calm, carry on, and take concrete steps to bring the situation back from the brink."

Based on field research, this chapter explores the motivations and objectives of the Afghan Taliban, and in light of this, it assesses the feasibility, risks, and implications of negotiations to resolve the conflict.

At the request of Afghan officials, Pakistan has reportedly released almost 40 Taliban combatants, supposedly to help spur peace negotiations. But experience shows this is wishful thinking. These prisoner releases give the Taliban something they want, while providing nothing in return.

"...[T]he United States rejected talks with the Taliban in the belief that it could defeat them. Unable to outfight or outlast the insurgents, it now favors a political solution. The problem with that, however, is that at this stage of the conflict, enmity and mistrust between the parties is engrained, U.S. influence is diminishing, and the Taliban are gaining ground."

Talking to the Taliban: Hope over History? provides a history of attempts to talk to the Taliban. The publication of the report coincides with the announcement that the United States will begin direct negotiations with the Taliban within days. The report charts the history of talks with the Taliban and their forebears. It explains that such talks are nothing new and that contacts have existed between the Taliban and the West for many years and argues that attempts to negotiate with the Taliban since 2001 have been characterised by wishful thinking, bad timing, poor management and the 'chaos of good intentions'.

"Most successful peace processes, such as in Northern Ireland, have required years of confidential discussions. Without secrecy, parties constantly feel they need to project an image of strength to their respective constituencies, which hardens positions and hinders progress. The events of the past few days signify a small step forward — but a great deal of difficult work lies ahead."