Asia & the Pacific

51 Items

Afghan security personnel guard around the Green Zone,

AP/Rahmat Gul

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Affairs

The Hearts-and-Minds Myth

| July 15, 2021

Jacqueline L. Hazelton analyzes why the United States fails at counterinsurgency in light of its withdrawal from Afghanistan. She asserts that the belief that democracy is necessary for long-term stability and can flow from the barrel of a gun is rooted in misleading accounts of past counterinsurgency campaigns, such as the Malayan Emergency and the 1948–1954 insurgency in the Philippines.

Security personnel are framed in a damaged door

AP/Rahmat Gul

Analysis & Opinions - Real Clear Defense

Self-Delusion and Forgetting History in Afghanistan

| Dec. 17, 2019

The authors comment on the Washington Post's recently released 6-part investigative report on the U.S. war in Afghanistan. They conclude that although important, this report is only alarming to the extent that it demonstrates how often U.S. leaders deceive themselves.

U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (from left) greet South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem at Washington National Airport

DoD/Department of the Air Force

Journal Article - Small Wars Journal

Bernard Fall as an Andrew Marshall Avant la Lettre (Part II)

| Dec. 09, 2019

SWJ interview with Nathaniel L. Moir, Ph.D., an Ernest May Postdoctoral Fellow in History and Policy at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Dr. Moir is completing a book manuscript on Bernard Fall for publication.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrives for a Conference on Afghanistan in Brussels, Oct. 5, 2016. The 2-day conference, hosted by the EU, will have the participation of over 70 countries to discuss the current situation in Afghanistan.

AP

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy

The 2016 Epidemic of Afghan War Amnesia

| October 16, 2016

"...[T]he well-intentioned Western effort to create a new Afghan state from scratch was equally misguided, as the new constitution envisioned a centralized, Western-style government in Kabul that was at odds with Afghan history and traditions. It also presumed a level of administrative competence and a revenue base that far exceeded Afghan capacities. Yet none of the international participants who embraced this outcome seemed to realize they had taken on an unrealistic and open-ended burden and that the new Afghan state would be dependent on lavish outside support more or less indefinitely."

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy

The Islamic State of Afghanistan

| December 22, 2015

"A negotiated solution would require a military stalemate on the ground, and this depends on NATO forces guaranteeing that Afghan forces in key positions will not be overrun. This is the political objective that should inform Western military support in Afghanistan from here on out: to make clear to the Taliban that they can achieve more through a peace deal than through fighting and to make clear to Western electorates that this isn't a forever war."

Afghan men stand near some posters which were destroyed by Taliban fighters, in a street of Kunduz, north of Kabul, Afghanistan, Oct. 1, 2015.

AP

Analysis & Opinions - The Boston Globe

The Second Kick of a Mule in Afghanistan

| October 1, 2015

"Whatever military victories were won by international forces during their time in Iraq and Afghanistan, the only true test of success in these wars is the long-term durability of their pro-Western regimes. But in both countries, these regimes are withering under the insurgent challenge and morphing into something quite unlike what their patrons intended."