Asia & the Pacific

David Kearn argues that the idea that the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945 would be by the United States in the defense of Taiwan against a conventional Chinese invasion would have significant, negative, and long-lasting, diplomatic ramifications. It is difficult to fathom the myriad potential consequences, but U.S. nuclear weapon use would almost certainly shatter the non-proliferation regime as a functioning entity, incentivize states (including China) to acquire or improve their existing nuclear arsenal, and damage America's standing globally.

David Kearn argues that even in the absence of restrictive resource and budgetary constraints, a focus on identifying and achieving concrete objectives that will position the United States and its allies to effectively deter aggression in critical regional flashpoints should be the priority given the stressed nature of the defense industrial base and the nuclear enterprise.

Kari A. Bingen and Heather W. Williams write that if Russia plans to deploy nuclear weapons in space to target satellites, the threat is definitely serious—and the U.S. should act fast.

David W. Kearn argues that deployment of nuclear weapons cannot rectify a perceived imbalance in conventional forces in the western Pacific.

Michael Lipin interviews Project on Managing the Atom Associate Nicole Grajewski on why Iran may not benefit much from its new membership of Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

This year’s heads of state meeting for the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Hiroshima, Japan demonstrated the agility of this body. The G7 leaders represent the powerhouse industrial democracies who are pulling their resources to maintain global economic stability and prosperity—and, this time, global security. In the course of 72 hours, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and the invited delegations took significant steps on some of the most pressing issues facing the world—from delivering F-16 aircraft to Ukraine to bolstering relations between Seoul and Tokyo and countering China’s economic coercion.

This year's G7 summit in Hiroshima sees nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sitting high on the agenda, amid rising tensions between the nuclear states and an increasingly divided international order.  Six contributors offer their analyses, including the Belfer Center's Mayumi Fukushima.

At the 2021 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, the bloc announced the approval of Iran's longstanding bid for membership. The Islamic Republic has viewed its involvement in the organization as a means of bolstering external legitimacy, fostering security-oriented regionalism, and promoting the transition toward the so-called multipolar world order. The SCO, led by Russia and China, has served as a regime-preservation network by providing Iran with a source of solidarity against external pressure. Tehran's commitment to the normative order, sustained by the SCO's discourse of noninterference, sovereignty, and countering the “three evils”—terrorism, extremism, and separatism—has galvanized the organization's role as a common front against the imposition of liberal norms and challenges to regime security.

In contrast to Nye’s definition of soft power compared to US “hard” power and diplomatic supremacy, it was Hu Jintao in 2007 who first used the term at the 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to link “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation to the ability of China to deploy cultural soft power (文化软实力)” (Hu, 2007). Subsequently in 2009, Hu Jintao emphasized that “[China] should strengthen public diplomacy and humanities diplomacy and commence various kinds of cultural exchange activities in order to disseminate China’s great culture” (Hu, 2009). While the phrase “soft power” often echoes Nye’s original vision, the idea’s central premise—that power is wielded through institutions to shape values—is very much in line with the Confucian idea of leadership by moral elites (德治天下); a philosophy that applies in the same way in both domestic and international contexts. Hu Jintao perceived the Chinese government’s influence on its own people as the primary determinant of China’s influence abroad. That ethos has carried over across China’s political and economic arenas.

The application of soft power in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) can be characterized as both ethno- and geo-centric. Parts of the MENA region began exercising soft power via pan-Arab solidarity movements during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and after the founding of the Arab League in 1945. Driven by upper- and middle-class urban actors, these movements were multi-faceted and centered around promoting pan-Arab soft power tools—such as culture and the Arabic language— as a departure from the region’s history of Western colonialism. While religious and the nationalist ideologies have since eclipsed pan-Arabism’s regional prominence, soft power remains a key tool for MENA diplomacy, particularly in the Gulf countries touting strong and wealthy state institutions. Saudi Arabia has seized soft power as a diplomatic tool through successfully branding its Vision 2030 strategy as a policy for opening the nation up to the rest of the world. Similarly, the Emirates’ own Vision 2030 agenda and Dubai’s hosting of Expo 2020 have become a symbol of the Emirates’ economic vitality and resource diversification beyond oil. Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup 2022 is widely viewed as the zenith of mega-events in the MENA region, having put the city state firmly on the map. Religious tourism—including the Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, the Shia pilgrimage in Iraq, and visiting biblical sites in both Jordan and Palestine—is another tool by which MENA governments exercise soft power and attract foreigners from abroad.

Belfer Center experts on the U.S.-China relationship and Middle East issues shared thoughts on the significance of the unexpected Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement brokered by China.