Asia & the Pacific

Stephen Walt writes that those who favor foreign policy restraint believe the United States should trade and invest in other countries, encourage other states to do the same, and be open to managed immigration instead of building walls in a fit of xenophobia.

In this deeply personal book, Joseph Nye shares his own journey living through the American century.

Americans have long seen their country as morally exceptional, but their exceptionalism actually comprises three distinct views. Whichever prevails in next year's presidential election will have significant implications for ongoing conflicts in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

Stephen Walt argues that prudent states should not assume that a norm against conquest will suffice to protect them; adequate hard power, shrewd diplomacy, and reliable allies are better—if still imperfect—guarantees.

Stephen Walt argues that in a multipolar world, the United States will be in an ideal situation to play the other major powers off against each other, and it can let its partners in Eurasia bear more of the burden of their own security. 

Stephen Walt analyzes why self-imposed restraint will always be a contradiction in terms for Washington. Ideology, power, bureaucratic momentum, and other states' desires to use U.S. power for their own ends combine to create a powerful predisposition to do something and a concomitant inability to set clear priorities and stick to them when temptation arises.

Grant Golub argues that the root cause of the so-called pivot to Asia's failure is Washington's continued belief that U.S. power and interests are global and universal. If U.S. decisionmakers truly seek to reorient U.S. strategic priorities, they need a clear hierarchy of the country's interests and obligations.

Stephen Walt writes that the world has returned to a state that realism explains best, one where great powers compete for power and influence and others adapt as best they can.

Joseph Nye argues hat the major threat to U.S. power comes from its internal divisions. These are serious liabilities but they were not created by the invasion of Ukraine.

Joseph Nye analyzes why the Cold War metaphor in relation to  the U.S. and China, although convenient, is lazy and potentially dangerous. It obscures and misleads us by underestimating the real challenge we face — and offering ineffective strategies.